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Chapter 1
Introduction
International trade is one of the driving forces behind the process of globalization. It has
grown at unprecedented speed during the past decades. In volume terms, world trade
expanded more than twenty-seven fold between 1950 and 2005, which corresponds to an
average annual growth rate of 6.2% (World Trade Organization, 2007). To a large extent,
this development can be attributed to technological advances in the transport sector,
such as the spread of container shipping, to lower information and communication costs,
and to the reduction of tariffs in successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations
(Jacks et al., 2008).
Trade theory generally predicts and empirical studies broadly confirm that open borders
allow countries to realize gains from specialization in production (e.g. Bernhofen and
Brown, 2005). Lower tariffs and transport costs encourage productive firms to intensify
their export activities. Competition increases, inefficient firms are driven out of the
market, and aggregate productivity rises (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008;
Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006). Consumers benefit from a larger variety of goods
(e.g. Broda and Weinstein, 2006) and lower prices (e.g. Harald, 2007).
This thesis is a collection of three essays which address very different questions relating
to this literature. Chapter two analyzes the welfare effects of trade liberalization for
consumers which do not behave fully rationally, as standard trade theory suggests, but
suffer from self-control problems. For them, lower prices and a larger choice of goods may
be harmful rather than beneficial. Chapter three shifts the focus to heterogeneous firms
which differ in their preferences about trade policies, and analyzes the level of protection
that emerges from a political process in which not all firms are equally involved. Chapter
four adds empirical evidence on the question of how firms actually ship their goods
abroad and how the choice of export mode depends on specific firm characteristics.
Against the paradigm of rationality, consumers often make economic decisions which
violate their own preferences. This perception is substantiated by recent experimental
and econometric evidence. If consumers suffer from self-control problems, for instance,
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they overvalue the immediate benefits of goods such as cigarettes, alcohol, or fast food,
and neglect the future costs of an unhealthy lifestyle. As a consequence, they consume
too much of these goods, as judged from their own perspective. If trade liberalization
leads to more variety and lower prices, the problem of overconsumption may get worse,
and the traditional gains from trade may vanish.
Chapter two analyzes the conditions under which consumers with self-control problems
may lose from trade, and the role that production technology and market structure
play for the welfare impact of trade on such boundedly rational consumers. To this
end, self-control problems are first integrated into a dynamic Ricardian model of inter-
industry trade with two countries and two goods, one of which is associated with self-
control problems. Self-control problems are modeled as time-inconsistent preferences
for immediate gratification which are captured by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function.
Consumers may differ in the severity of their self-control problem. In this setting, the
welfare effects of trade depend on the direction of trade, the degree of self-control,
and the price-sensitivity of consumers. Consumers in the country that imports the
good associated with self-control problems may lose, provided that their self-control
problem and their reaction to a price reduction is sufficiently strong. In this case,
the loss due to increased overconsumption overcompensates the traditional gains from
specialization. Imposing a tariff on the imported good that is associated with self-control
problems and redistributing the proceeds in a lump sum fashion alleviates the problem of
overconsumption and makes trade a Pareto-improvement. In the exporting country, no
such policy is required, as the increase in the price of the exported good mitigates rather
than exacerbates the problem of overconsumption for consumers with low self-control.
These results are quite intuitive and mainly driven by price movements. Changing the
assumptions on production technology and market structure does however lead to sur-
prising conclusions. In a trade model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
competition, consumers with self-control problems may lose in both countries, as variety
increases and prices decrease on both sides of the border. In fact, even fully rational
consumers may lose from trade if there is heterogeneity in the degree of self-control not
only within countries, but also across countries. In particular, if a country starts trad-
ing with another country in which the average degree of self-control is larger, aggregate
demand and hence the available product variety may be reduced through trade, which
makes fully self-controlled consumers worse off.
This chapter does not only bridge a gap between international trade theory and be-
havioral economics, an economic discipline which has caught a lot of attention in the
last decade. It also has some implications for real world situations. During the 1980’s,
for instance, some Asian countries were forced to drastically cut their import tariffs on
cigarettes, and per capita consumption of cigarettes significantly increased. If this were
the consequence of fully rational consumer behavior, then trade would be nothing to
worry about. However, if consumers suffered from self-control problems as the evidence
3suggests, the reduction of import tariffs created a need for compensating government
action.
Chapter three shifts the perspective from heterogeneous consumers to heterogeneous
firms and the endogenous formation of trade policies.
That firms play an important role in shaping trade policies is uncontroversial. Likewise,
it is uncontested that some firms exert more pressure than others. Empirical evidence
from political science suggests that it is predominantly large firms which lobby for trade
policies, while small firms usually lack the resources necessary to raise their voices. If
large and small firms also differ in their interests regarding trade policies, the fact that
only the large firms lobby has important implications for the level of protection that
emerges from the political process.
Chapter three develops a model of intra-industry trade and shows that there is indeed a
conflict of interest between large and small firms when it comes to non-tariff barriers to
trade such as technical standards, certification requirements, or testing procedures which
raise the fixed costs of gaining market access. Due to the national treatment principle
of the World Trade Organization, such regulations apply to both foreign exporters and
domestic firms. Small and inefficient domestic firms are not able to cover the higher fixed
costs associated with additional regulations and exit the market. This allows large and
productive firms to reap additional market shares and profits. Thus, although non-tariff
barriers to trade are inefficient from a social welfare perspective, the model suggests that
if only the largest firms lobby the domestic government, non-tariff barriers to trade will
nevertheless be implemented, which is consistent with recent evidence on the prevalence
of technical barriers to trade. Comparative static exercises show that the equilibrium
level of technical barriers to trade is the higher the stronger the profit-shifting effect
between domestic firms, and the weaker the government’s concern about social welfare.
The analysis is extended to other non-tariff barriers to trade such as customs and admin-
istrative procedures which affect only foreign exporters. Such regulations do not create
a conflict of interest among domestic firms, which are shielded from foreign competition
and make higher profits at the expense of the domestic consumers, who have less va-
rieties at their disposal. Although they are welfare reducing, the domestic government
may implement such measures in the political equilibrium, provided that the domestic
firms’ gains from such regulations loom large and the government does not care much
about social welfare.
The model presented in the third chapter of this thesis adds to the existing literature
on the political economy of trade policy by emphasizing the role of trade barriers which
represent fixed costs. Most of the contributions that followed the seminal “Protection
for Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) focus on variable trade costs such
as import tariffs and export subsidies, which have recently lost importance relative to
non-tariff barriers to trade. Also, Grossman and Helpman (1994) and most other papers
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in this line of literature perform a purely sectoral analysis without paying attention to
the role of individual firms.
Chapter four adds some empirical evidence on the export behavior of firms. Opposed
to what international trade theory typically assumes, manufacturers do not always ship
their goods directly to their foreign customers, but call in trade intermediaries to per-
form this task for them. These are economic agents such as wholesalers, retailers and
trading companies in the importing and exporting country which help manufacturers
and customers to meet and transact (Spulber, 1998). Which manufacturers make use of
this option? Theory suggests that it is mostly the small firms which are not profitable
enough to cover the high fixed costs of building an own distribution network abroad.
However, intermediated trade is generally associated with higher variable trade costs
and lower export revenues due to additional markups on side of the intermediary or
difficulties related to the enforcement of contracts between the intermediary and the
manufacturer. Therefore, large and efficient firms with high export volumes prefer to
ship their goods directly to their final consumers. The third chapter brings this hypoth-
esis to a test. Using survey data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in
Turkey in 2008, it shows that there is indeed a negative correlation between firm size
and the relative importance of intermediated exports. This result is highly robust to the
inclusion of a variety of controls, different estimation methods, and different measures of
firm size. Further, being part of a larger company is generally associated with a higher
prevalence of indirect exports as opposed to direct exports. Offering new and sophis-
ticated products, on the contrary, leads to relatively less intermediated trade, which is
consistent with the idea that innovative firms prefer a higher level of control.
Although these essays represent three independent pieces of research, they are linked
by a common theme. In all of them, agent heterogeneity plays an important role for
the outcome of international trade relations. The second chapter focuses on consumer
heterogeneity and shows that being more or less rational has important consequences
for the welfare effects of globalization. Maybe surprisingly, being more rational does
not always imply being better off under free trade. The third chapter deals with het-
erogeneity on side of the firms which produce the traded goods. Empirical studies have
shown that firms differ in their size and productivity and hence in their ability to cover
the fixed costs associated with accessing the domestic or foreign market. This implies
that they also differ in their preferences regarding specific trade policies. If not all firms
equally engage in the political process that shapes these trade policies, firm heterogene-
ity has important implications for the prevailing level of protection. Abstracting from
the political dimension of international trade, differences in size and productivity also
determine how firms actually ship their goods. Analyzing data from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey, the fourth chapter shows that large and productive firms export their
goods directly, while small and inefficient firms rather rely on trade intermediaries. In a
nutshell, this thesis demonstrates that both consumer and firm heterogeneity matter for
5a variety of outcomes in international trade relations. It affects the welfare consequences
of globalization, the implementation of protectionist policies, and the choice of different
export modes.
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Chapter 2
Trade liberalization and self-control
problems
2.1 Introduction
A central result in international trade theory and the most powerful argument of the
proponents of globalization is that trade liberalization creates welfare gains. In classic
trade theory, gains from trade arise from specialization in production and the exploita-
tion of differences in preferences and endowments across countries. Real incomes rise
and the average consumer in each country is better off, independent of the direction of
trade. New trade theories focus on imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale
as sources of gains from trade. When trade is liberalized, firms serve a larger market
and average costs decline. Consumers benefit from lower prices and a larger variety of
products.
However, in each case the gains from trade result hinges on several assumptions. One
of them, which is common to all trade models, is that individuals behave fully ratio-
nally in the sense that they would never do anything that violates their own preferences.
Yet, recent research in behavioral economics suggests that this is often an inappropriate
abstraction. For instance, there is by now substantial experimental and econometric
evidence that people suffer from self-control problems when making economic decisions
which involve benefits and costs occurring at different points in time.1 Striving for im-
mediate gratification, they are tempted to consume more than optimal of goods which
generate instantaneous benefits but entail future costs. Such goods are also called sin
goods. Examples include cigarettes, alcohol, or fast food. Individuals plan to smoke,
drink, or eat less in order to enjoy a healthier and happier life, but when the moment of
1Frederick et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the respective studies. Gruber and
Ko¨szegi (2004) also review different kinds of evidence on self-control problems, but with a focus on
smoking behavior.
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the decision has arrived, they revise their plans and consume more cigarettes, alcohol,
or unhealthy food than they initially intended to. If trade in such goods is liberalized
and leads to an expanded choice set and lower prices, the problem of overconsumption
may in fact get worse for some consumers, and gains from trade are no longer guaran-
teed. When consumers are heterogeneous in their degree of self-control, trade will also
have distributional consequences, even if preferences are otherwise identical, and the
advantageousness of trade depends on whether feasible redistribution mechanisms exist.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the welfare effects of trade when consumers
lack self-control. Which factors determine who gains and who loses from trade, and how
much? Is the distribution of winners and losers within and across countries sensitive to
changes in the assumptions on production technology and market structure of the sin
good? And finally, can we find instruments that correct for the inefficiencies caused by
self-control problems and make trade a Pareto-improvement over autarky, thus saving
the gains from trade argument?
To address these questions, self-control problems are first incorporated into a dynamic
Ricardian model of inter-industry trade with two countries and two goods. As in
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), who analyze optimal taxes, self-control problems are
modeled as time-inconsistent preferences for immediate gratification which apply to
only one of the two goods. Individuals within a country may differ in their degree
of self-control. In this setting, the welfare consequences depend on the direction of trade
and on the price-sensitivity of consumers. Provided that they react strongly enough to
price changes, individuals in the country importing the sin good lose if their self-control
problem is sufficiently large, and if the traditional gains due to specialization and ex-
change are only small. This is because the declining price induces individuals with a
lack of willpower to consume even more of the sin good. The loss due to inefficient
overconsumption rises and overcompensates the traditional gains from trade. However,
if individuals with low self-control are hardly responsive to price changes, trade does
not aggravate their problem of overconsumption, and all consumers in the importing
country are better off compared to autarky. In case some individuals lose, the welfare
gains from trade can be redistributed by imposing a tariff on the imported good such
that the price under trade equals the price in autarky and distributing the proceeds in
a lump sum fashion. This way, the gains due to specialization can be realized without
worsening the problem of overconsumption. In the exporting country, where the relative
price of the sin good increases after borders open up, all individuals unambiguously gain
from trade. Here, the rising price serves a self-control function, mitigating the problem
of overconsumption. The more price-sensitive consumers with low self-control are, the
stronger is this beneficial effect, and thus the higher are their gains from trade compared
to the gains of the fully self-controlled individuals.
While the results in the Ricardian setting are essentially driven by price movements
and are rather intuitive, the integration of self-control problems into a trade model with
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increasing returns to scale in production and monopolistic competition leads to surprising
conclusions. In this setting, it is no longer the case that individuals with self-control
problems gain from trade in at least one country. In fact, trade can lead to a decreasing
price and a larger variety of the sin good in both countries, and thus exacerbates the
problem of overconsumption for individuals with a lack of willpower on both sides of the
border. In addition, heterogeneity in the degree of self-control across countries opens
up the possibility that in one country even the fully self-controlled individuals lose from
trade. This will be the case if the average degree of self-control is larger in the open
economy than in the closed economy. All else equal, a larger average degree of self-
control reduces aggregate demand, which reduces the available product variety and thus
counteracts the conventional, beneficial effect of trade liberalization for the fully self-
controlled. Hence, production technology and market structure play a decisive role in
determining who gains and who loses from trade and need to be carefully taken into
account when deriving policy recommendations.
By introducing time-inconsistent preferences into models of trade, the present piece of
research bridges a gap between international trade theory and new insights from be-
havioral economics. Even though more realistic psychological foundations of economic
behavior have by now found acceptance and applications in macroeconomics, labor eco-
nomics, and, most notably, finance,2 they have hardly found their way into international
trade theory.3 The theoretical work most closely related to the present paper deals
with the issue of optimal taxation in case individuals have time-inconsistent preferences.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) consider a model with two goods, one of which is as-
sociated with self-control problems, and analyze whether a small tax on the sin good
improves social welfare. In principle, trade liberalization has the same effect like a tax
on the price of the sin good in the importing country, and thus has similar implications
for individual and social welfare. Yet, the analysis in the present paper differs in some
aspects from O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006). First, I will resort to their formulation
of preferences, since it makes the model analytically tractable, but I will abstract from
population heterogeneity in tastes to further simplify the analysis and concentrate on
population heterogeneity in the degree of self-control. Second, their welfare analysis
rests on marginal arguments. Such arguments cannot be used to compare autarky with
free trade, since these are effectively two different states of the world. Yet another and
maybe the most important difference is that the present paper adopts a general equi-
librium perspective and explicitly models the production sector and the labor market
of the economy, while O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) assume that marginal costs and
hence wages are fixed and that individuals are given an exogenously fixed income.
2See Camerer et al. (2004) and Frederick et al. (2002) for a collection of the most important recent
contributions.
3Two noteworthy exceptions are Freund and O¨zden (2008) and Tovar (2009), who analyze the
implications of loss aversion for trade policy, both theoretically and empirically.
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However, analyzing the welfare effects of trade liberalization in the presence of self-
control problems is not only of theoretical interest. In the mid 1980’s, the U.S. forced four
Asian countries to drastically cut their import tariffs on cigarettes by threatening them
with retaliatory sanctions. As a consequence, per capita cigarette consumption in these
four countries increased significantly (Chaloupka and Laixuthai, 1996). The positive
relationship between trade liberalization in general and smoking has been identified for
other low- and middle income countries as well (Bettcher et al., 2001; Taylor et al.,
2000). The negative health effects of smoking are well documented and have induced
the public to blame free trade in cigarettes for reducing the subjective well-being of
consumers. Accepting that individuals have time-inconsistent preferences with respect
to smoking would support such a claim and provide an economic rationale for government
intervention that goes beyond negative externalities or incorrect information. A similar
case has been made for unhealthy food. Amongst other factors, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (2008) holds imports of foods from industrialized countries, which are rich
in fat and sugar, responsible for changing nutrition patterns and growing obesity in
developing countries. As Stutzer (2007) shows empirically, obesity reduces the subjective
well-being of individuals who lack self-control. For them, the availability of Western style
food does more harm than good.
In the following section, I will illustrate in more detail the case of trade in cigarettes
as one example where self-control problems might influence the benefits of free trade.
In section 2.3, I will present a simple way to model self-control problems as present-
biased preferences. These preferences will then be incorporated into a Ricardian model
to analyze the welfare consequences of trade under constant returns to scale and perfect
competition in section 2.4. Section 2.5 deals with self-control problems and the welfare
consequences of trade in a model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
competition. Section 2.6 summarizes the results and concludes.
2.2 Self-control problems and the liberalization of
trade in cigarettes
In the past thirty years, tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have been reduced in
many countries and for a variety of goods and services, including cigarettes. Tobacco
companies such as Philip Morris or British American Tobacco, facing a declining demand
in the United States and Western Europe, actively promoted the liberalization of trade
in tobacco, and seized the opportunity to target the newly opened markets in Asia,
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa.4 Consequently, world exports of
4Details on the companies’ business strategies were revealed in 1998, when once secret tobacco indus-
try documents were made publicly available as a result of legal action. See World Health Organization
(2004) and Bettcher et al. (2001) for an overview.
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cigarettes increased from 59 billions of pieces in 1960 to 322 billions of pieces in 1980. In
2004, world exports of cigarettes amounted to 749 billions of pieces (Foreign Agricultural
Service, 2007).
After having opened their borders to foreign cigarette imports, many countries experi-
enced a sharp increase in per capita consumption of cigarettes. In fact, several empirical
studies have confirmed a causal relationship running from trade liberalization to cigarette
consumption. For instance, Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1996) analyze annual time series
data from 1970 to 1991 for ten Asian countries, four of which were forced to open their
markets to U.S. cigarette imports in the mid-1980’s under the threat of retaliatory sanc-
tions, namely Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Their results suggest that
per capita consumption in the liberalized countries was on average ten percent higher
than it would have been if imports had remained restricted. Hsieh et al. (1999) estimate
the demand for domestic and imported cigarettes in Taiwan using 1966-1995 annual
time series data. They conclude that opening the borders to U.S. cigarette imports
has had two effects. First, consumers have switched from domestic to imported brands
and second, overall consumption of cigarettes has increased. These results are in line
with Hsu et al. (2005), who compare actual with projected trends for smoking rates
in Taiwan for the period after market opening in 1986. Based on data from consumer
surveys of the Monopoly Bureau and the National Health Interview Survey they show
that in 2001, the actual smoking rates were significantly higher than the projected ones,
both for males and females. In addition, the data reveal that per capita consumption
of cigarettes in Taiwan increased by 30% from 1986 to 2001. Taylor et al. (2000) use
a larger data set including 42 countries from 1970 to 1995. Estimating fixed-effects
models separately for low-income, middle-income, and high-income countries with per
capita cigarette consumption as the dependent variable, they find that trade openness
has had a significantly positive effect on smoking in lower- and middle-income countries.
Bettcher et al. (2001) proceed in a similar fashion, but with a larger data set covering
80 countries from 1970 to 1997. Their results are consistent with Taylor et al. (2000),
indicating that trade openness has contributed to an increase in per capita cigarette
consumption in low- and middle-income countries.
There is also more indirect evidence of the positive relationship between trade liberaliza-
tion and cigarette consumption. In many countries, including Japan, Taiwan, South Ko-
rea, and Thailand, the tobacco industry was controlled by a government run monopoly
before trade in tobacco was liberalized. As pointed out by Chaloupka and Laixuthai
(1996), opening borders has led to increased competition and lower prices. The inverse
relationship between prices and tobacco consumption is in turn well documented, with
most estimates of the overall price elasticity ranging from -0,25 to -0,5 for high-income
countries. Middle- and low-income countries are generally more price sensitive, with
most estimates ranging from -0,5 to -1,0. Lower prices both increase smoking prevalence
and boost conditional cigarette demand. For the United States, estimates indicate that
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at least half of the overall price elasticity can be attributed to smoking prevalence (see
Chaloupka and Warner (2000) and Chaloupka et al. (2000) for a survey of the respective
studies). For lower- and middle-income countries, studies separating the effect of prices
on prevalence and smoking intensity do not exist, which is partly due to the lack of
reliable individual-level data. One exception is a study by Mao and Xiang (1997), who
estimate a prevalence elasticity of -0.89 and a conditional demand elasticity of -0.18 in
the Chinese province Sichuan.
Unlike other consumer goods, however, cigarettes entail enormous health costs. Numer-
ous epidemiologic studies have shown that smoking is causal for a variety of cancers
as well as for several cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.5 As pointed out by Peto
and Lopez (2001), half of lifetime smokers die prematurely. Viscusi and Hersch (2008)
estimate that the discounted expected mortality costs of smoking, measured in terms of
foregone income due to premature death, amount to 222 $ per pack for a male consumer
and 94 $ for a female consumer, assuming a 3% discount rate.
To sum up, there is strong evidence that trade liberalization has led to increased cigarette
consumption in the importing countries, and it is an established fact that such an in-
crease has devastating health consequences, although these occur with a delay of several
years or even decades.6 Correspondingly, Mathers and Loncar (2006) predict that the
total number of premature, tobacco-related deaths will rise from 5.4 million in 2005
to 8.3 million in 2030. Regional aggregates are not available, but Mathers and Loncar
(2006) suggest that it will decline in high-income countries, while it will double in low-
and middle income countries. Ezzati and Lopez (2004) estimate that the fraction of
adult deaths that can be attributed to smoking was 12% in 2000, with large variations
across regions, age, and gender. Males in the industrialized countries had the highest
smoking mortality rates, which is not surprising given the long latency and the only
recent cutbacks in smoking. However, the developing countries are catching up. Wen
et al. (2005) provide estimates for Taiwan, indicating that smoking attributable male
mortality will increase from 16% in 2001 to 20% in 2020 if current smoking patterns
persist.
From a traditional economic viewpoint, the negative consequences of smoking alone do
not justify any intervention. Rational consumers would foresee the future health costs
and would take them fully into account when deciding whether and how much to smoke.
They weigh the immediate benefits of a cigarette against the future costs and make a
decision that maximizes their lifetime utility. Thus, apart from additional effects such as
negative externalities or incorrect information about the risks and the addictive potential
5The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004) and the World Health Organization
(2005) provide a comprehensive overview of the scientific evidence on the health consequences of smok-
ing.
6On the delay between the onset of smoking and the occurrence of smoking-related diseases, see
Gajalakshmi et al. (2000) and the literature cited therein.
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involved, there is no scope for government action.7 Free trade is the best policy. Yet,
there is substantial evidence that this is not quite true. Individuals lack self-control with
regard to smoking, and thus make sub-optimal consumption decisions.8 The traditional
gains from trade argument does no longer hold.
2.3 Modeling self-control problems
Self-control problems arise when individuals have time-inconsistent, present-biased pref-
erences. They overvalue the immediate benefits of a good while neglecting the future
costs of its consumption and consequently consume more than they would have judged to
be optimal from a prior perspective.9 Present-biased intertemporal preferences are char-
acterized by discount factors which increase over time. In a discrete time setting, this key
qualitative feature can be captured by assuming a quasi-hyperbolic discount function.
Mainly because of its analytical tractability, such a function has been widely used to
model self-control problems since Laibson (1997). Originally, it has been introduced by
Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study intergenerational altruism. With a quasi-hyperbolic
discount function, the discounted utility of an individual at time t is
Ut(ut, ..., uT ) ≡ ut + β
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tuτ (2.1)
where ut is the instantaneous utility in period t, β ≤ 1, and δ ≤ 1. This formulation
implies a discount factor of βδ between the current and the next period and a discount
factor of δ between two consecutive periods in the future. For β < 1, the discount factor
increases over time, and the individual revises her initial plans for future consumption
once the future has arrived. The smaller is β, the larger is the individual’s tendency to
overvalue immediate benefits and the stronger is the self-control problem. For β = 1, the
discount factor is constant, and we are back to a setting with time-consistent preferences.
Similar to O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), I assume an instantaneous utility function of
the form
ut ≡ v(xt)− c(xt−1) + zt (2.2)
where xt denotes consumption at period t of the good associated with self-control prob-
lems and c(xt−1) describes the negative consequences of consumption that occurred one
period ago. Good x may be a homogeneous good, as in the Ricardian model, or a
7The rationale for intervention in the case of negative externalities and information failures and the
available policy options are discussed extensively in Jha et al. (2000).
8See, for instance, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), Hersch (2005), and Kan (2007).
9Similarly, if something has immediate costs, but generates future benefits, individuals with self-
control problems will choose too little of it, a phenomenon that is also known as procrastination.
Examples are studying for exams or saving for retirement.
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differentiated good, as in the increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition
setting. Utility is quasilinear in zt, which denotes consumption at period t of a composite
good that is not subject to self-control problems and serves as a nume´raire. Marginal
benefits are assumed to be positive and decreasing, i.e. vx > 0 and vxx < 0. Marginal
costs are also assumed to be positive, cx > 0, but might be increasing, constant, or
decreasing, i.e. cxx > 0, cxx = 0, or cxx < 0, with the additional restriction that
vxx − cxx < 0 to ensure that consumption is well-behaved.
In contrast to O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), who allow for marginal utilities and
marginal costs to differ across individuals, I abstract from heterogeneity in tastes, since
this alone would make trade more beneficial for some persons than for others. Here, I
want to focus on the role of differing degrees of self-control for the distributional conse-
quences of trade and thus allow for heterogeneity in the self-control parameter β only.
The traditional discount factor δ is assumed to be identical for all individuals, and is set
to 1 for simplicity.
With the instantaneous utility function given in (2.2) and δ = 1, the discounted utility
at time t of an individual with self-control parameter β can be written as
Ut = v(xt)−c(xt−1)+zt+β (v(xt+1)− c(xt) + zt+1 + ...+ v(xT )− c(xT−1) + zT ) . (2.3)
In period t, the individual chooses a consumption allocation for the current period, xt
and zt, and makes a plan of consumption allocations for all future periods, xt+1, zt+1,
..., xT , zT to maximize (2.3) subject to a budget constraint for each period t, t + 1, ...,
T . I assume that in each period an individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically
and is paid the equilibrium wage. Borrowings and savings are ruled out, such that in
each period total labor income is spent on consumption. Given the additively separable
structure of preferences and the absence of borrowings and savings, the consumption
decisions of different periods are independent. Hence, in period t, the individual chooses
xt and zt to maximize v(xt) − βc(xt) + zt subject to the period t budget constraint,
ptxt+zt = wt. Moreover, she plans to consume xt+1 and zt+1 in period t+1 to maximize
β (v(xt+1)− c(xt+1) + zt+1) or, equivalently, v(xt+1)−c(xt+1)+zt+1 subject to the period
t+ 1 budget constraint, pt+1xt+1 + zt+1 = wt+1. However, once period t+ 1 has arrived,
the discounted utility function is Ut+1. The individual revises the plans she has made
one period ago and now chooses xt+1 and zt+1 to maximize v(xt+1) − βc(xt+1) + zt+1
subject to the period t + 1 budget constraint. Future costs of consumption weigh less
heavily than they did one period ago. In principle, unless wages and prices change over
time, an individual solves the same optimization problem in each period, and I will omit
the time subscript for notational convenience. In each period, the individual chooses
current consumption, maximizing v(x) − βc(x) + z ≡ u∗(x, z), and makes a plan for
future consumption, maximizing v(x) − c(x) + z ≡ u∗∗(x, z), which will be revised one
period later.
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Given that the preferences of an individual with self-control problems change over time,
defining an appropriate welfare criterion is inherently problematic. A common approach
in the literature is to evaluate actual choices according to the individual’s long-run
preferences.10 These preferences reflect the consumption plan the individual would like
to commit to in advance if this was possible. I will follow this approach and measure
an individual’s welfare by u∗∗(x, z). According to Kahneman (1994), one may interpret
u∗(x, z) as “decision utility”, which governs an individual’s consumption choices, and
u∗∗(x, z) as “experienced utility”, which reflects the subjective well-being the individual
derives from these choices. For an individual with time-inconsistent preferences, decision
utility and experienced utility diverge, implying that the individual makes consumption
choices which are not in her best interest, in the sense that they do not give her the
highest possible level of happiness and satisfaction.
In the following section, I will focus on interior solutions to the optimization problem. If
(x∗, z∗) is the actual choice maximizing u∗(x, z), this implies that vx(x∗)−βcx(x∗)−p = 0
and z∗ = w − px∗. Similarly, if (x∗∗, z∗∗) is the ideal choice maximizing u∗∗(x, z), it
must be that vx(x
∗∗) − cx(x∗∗) − p = 0 and z∗∗ = w − px∗∗. From the first order
conditions, one can immediately replicate three basic results of O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2006). First, for all p and all β < 1, x∗ > x∗∗, meaning that people with self-control
problems consume more than optimal of the good with immediate benefits and future
costs. Second, actual consumption increases as the self-control problem gets worse,
dx∗/dβ = −cx(x∗)/−(vxx(x∗)− βcxx(x∗)) < 0. And third, actual consumption increases
as the price declines, dx∗/dp = −1/− (vxx(x∗)− βcxx(x∗)) < 0.
2.4 Ricardian model
I will now incorporate these time-inconsistent preferences into a classic Ricardian two
countries, two goods model of international trade. To analyze the welfare effects of
trade, I will compare the autarky and the trade equilibrium for consumers with different
degrees of self-control in both countries. An example will help to illustrate the results.
2.4.1 Model description
For concreteness, I name the two countries Home and Foreign, and index all variables and
parameters by H and F , respectively. I assume that in each period, there is a continuum
of individuals with mass LH in Home and LF in Foreign. Each individual maximizes
her decision utility u∗(x, z) with respect to x and z as described in the previous section.
10See for example O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), or Gruber and
Ko¨szegi (2004). For a discussion of alternative welfare criteria, see Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla
(2004).
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Individuals within each country differ with respect to their degree of self-control, as
described by the cumulative distribution functions H(β) and F (β). Given that each
individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically, total labor supply in each period is
LH in Home and LF in Foreign. It is used to produce goods x and z according to the
following production functions:
QiH =
LiH
aiH
and QiF =
LiF
aiF
with i = x, z (2.4)
where QiH is the output of good i in country H, LiH is the total amount of labor used
in sector i in country H, and aiH are the units of labor needed to produce one unit of
good i in country H. Labor is mobile intersectorally, but not internationally, and goods
and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
2.4.2 Autarky and trade equilibrium
Since individual decisions at different points in time are independent of one another, and
production technologies as well as labor supply do not change over time, the equilibrium
allocations and prices will be identical for each period in autarky and for each period
under trade, respectively. An autarky equilibrium in Home for any period consists of
inputs (LxH , LzH), outputs (QxH , QzH), a consumption tuple (x, z) for each individual,
and prices (pH , wH) such that (i) individual consumption choices are feasible and maxi-
mize u∗(x, z), given prices, (ii) firms’ input and output choices are feasible and maximize
profits, given prices, (iii) labor markets clear, LxH + LzH = LH , and (iv) goods mar-
kets clear, LH
∫
x(pH , wH , β)dH(β) = QxH and LH
∫
z(pH , wH , β)dH(β) = QzH . The
analogous definition applies to Foreign.
A trade equilibrium for any period are inputs, outputs, consumption tuples in both coun-
tries, and prices (p, wH , wF ) such that (i) to (iii) continue to hold in each country, (iv’)
world goods markets clear, LH
∫
x(p, wH , β)dH(β)+LF
∫
x(p, wF , β)dF (β) = QxH+QxF
and LH
∫
z(p, wH , β)dH(β) +LF
∫
z(p, wF , β)dF (β) = QzH +QzF , and (v) trade is bal-
anced. These equilibrium definitions are those of a classic Ricardian model, with the
exception that individuals are heterogeneous in the preferences governing their consump-
tion behavior.
Due to the intersectoral mobility of labor, wages are equalized across sectors within each
country. When both goods are produced and consumed in each country in the autarky
equilibrium, perfect competition requires that prices equal marginal costs in both sectors
in Home and Foreign. With the price of good z being normalized to 1 and pAH and p
A
F
denoting the autarky equilibrium prices of good x in Home and Foreign, this implies pAH =
axH/azH and p
A
F = axF/azF . Hence, autarky equilibrium prices are solely determined
by production technologies. I assume that Foreign has a comparative advantage in
producing good x, meaning that axH/azH > axF/azF . Under this assumption, the
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relative price of the good associated with self-control problems is higher in Home than
in Foreign in the autarky equilibrium. When borders open up, the relative price of good
x in the trade equilibrium, pT , is bounded by the two autarky prices, pAF ≤ pT ≤ pAH .11
However, trade only has an effect on welfare if the relative price changes. Therefore, I
will concentrate on the more interesting case where pAF < p
T < pAH . In this case, each
country fully specializes in the production of the good in which it has a comparative
advantage and the world supply of good x is LF/axF , while the world supply of good z
is LH/azH .
2.4.3 Welfare effects of trade liberalization
Given that consumption and production decisions in different periods are independent
of one another, it is irrelevant in which period trade is liberalized to decide whether an
individual benefits from opening up borders. One can simply compare her experienced
utility for trade equilibrium choices with her experienced utility for autarky equilibrium
choices. The difference may then be interpreted as the per period gain from trade
measured in units of the nume´raire z. For an individual in Home with self-control
parameter β it is
GH = u
∗∗(x∗TH , z
∗T
H )− u∗∗(x∗AH , z∗AH ) (2.5)
= u∗(x∗TH , z
∗T
H )− u∗(x∗AH , z∗AH )︸ ︷︷ ︸
traditional gains (>0)
− (1− β) (c(x∗TH )− c(x∗AH ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss due to increased overconsumption (>0)
(2.6)
with (x∗TH , z
∗T
H ) denoting the individual’s decision utility maximizing choice in the trade
equilibrium and (x∗AH , z
∗A
H ) denoting her decision utility maximizing choice in the autarky
equilibrium. Since pT < pAH and x
∗ is decreasing in p, x∗TH > x
∗A
H . The first part of
equation (6) reflects the traditional gains from trade, which would arise if the consumer
had time-consistent preferences and her experienced utility coincided with her decision
utility. These gains are unambiguously positive as can be shown with standard revealed
preference arguments. The second part of equation (6) only applies if the individual has
time-inconsistent preferences and β < 1. It reflects the fact that the individual does not
fully take into account the increase in costs when consuming more of good x in response
to the price decline. The resulting inefficiency reduces the traditional gains from trade,
and total gains from trade may become negative.
The gains from trade for an individual in Foreign can be obtained by replacing H by
F in equations (5) and (6). As for an individual in Home, they can be divided into a
traditional part and a component that is due to the self-control problem. The traditional
11Recall that individual and thus aggregate demand for good x is decreasing in p. For pT < pAF ,
production of good x would fall to zero in both countries while demand would increase relative to the
autarky equilibrium, resulting in excess demand. Similarly, for pT > pAH , production of good x would
rise while demand would decrease, resulting in excess supply.
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part is again positive. In contrast to the Home country, however, the second component
is negative. This is because the relative price of the good associated with self-control
problems rises in Foreign compared to autarky, pT > pAF , and consumption declines,
x∗TF < x
∗A
F . Trade effectively mitigates the self-control problem by reducing the costs
that cause inefficient consumption since they are not fully taken into account. Thus,
the total gains from trade for any individual in Foreign are unambiguously positive, no
matter whether the individual suffers from self-control problems or not. Summing up, if
there exists an autarky equilibrium and a trade equilibrium in which Home specializes
in the production of good z and Foreign specializes in the production of good x, and if
each individual consumes both goods x and z in autarky and under trade, which I will
assume throughout, then the following is true:
Proposition 2.1
1. If the individual lives in Home, she gains from trade for β = 1 and may gain or
lose from trade for β < 1.
2. If the individual lives in Foreign, she gains from trade for all β ≤ 1.
When are consumers in Home more likely to lose from trade? Some comparative static
helps to answer this question. First, an important determinant of the benefits from
trade liberalization is the degree of self-control. Yet, a larger self-control problem does
not necessarily imply that an individual is more likely to lose. The derivative
∂GH
∂β
= −(1− β)
(
cx(x
∗T
H )
∂x∗TH
∂β
− cx(x∗AH )
∂x∗AH
∂β
)
(2.7)
suggests that it depends on how strongly individuals with different degrees of self-control
react to the price reduction from pAH to p
T . If consumers with low self-control are more
price responsive than those with high self-control, their problem of overconsumption gets
worse more than it does for those with high self-control, and they experience a smaller
gain or a larger loss in utility, respectively. Consumers with lower self-control are more
price responsive if the following assumption is satisfied:
Assumption 2.1 For all x, 2cxx(vxx − βcxx) < cx(vxxx − βcxxx).
It is sufficient for cx(x
∗)∂x∗/∂β to be decreasing in x∗ and thus for the gains from trade
in Home to be increasing in β. Assumption 2.1 is satisfied for most commonly used
utility functions when costs are linear or quadratic, e.g. for log utility and linear costs.12
12Assumption 2.1 is not satisfied e.g. for quadratic utility and linear costs, v(x) = −b(x − a)2 with
b > 0, a > 0 and c(x) = cx. In this case, demand functions for good x are linear, and the slope is
independent of β. Hence, as the price of good x falls, individuals with low self control consume more
to the same extent as individuals with high self-control do and thus make the same gains from trade.
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Analogously, if individuals in Foreign with low self-control are more price responsive
than those with high self-control, they benefit more from the price increase from pAF to
pT , as they reduce their overconsumption more than those with high self control do.
Therefore, assumption 2.1 is also sufficient for the gains from trade in Foreign to be
decreasing in β.
Proposition 2.2 If assumption 2.1 is satisfied, ∂GH/∂β > 0 and ∂GF/∂β < 0, that
is in Home individuals with higher self-control gain more from trade, while in Foreign
individuals with lower self-control gain more from trade.
In the optimal taxation framework of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), the same assump-
tion is sufficient for small taxes on good x to create Pareto-improvements if the tax
proceeds are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion and individuals differ only with re-
spect to β. This is not surprising, given that in a Ricardian setting a tax and trade
liberalization have the same effect in the Home country: they both change the relative
price p, albeit in opposite directions. When a small tax is levied and individuals with
self-control problems are sufficiently price responsive, the price hike helps them to reduce
their overconsumption, and this effect outweighs their loss in real income. When trade
is liberalized and individuals with self-control problems are sufficiently price responsive,
the decline in price exacerbates their overconsumption, thus reducing their gains in real
income. If all individuals were forced to bear an equal share of the hypothetical costs
that would arise if the government wanted to guarantee trade prices in an autarky situ-
ation by subsidizing good x, then everybody in Home would be weakly worse off under
free trade. However, these costs do not have to be borne under free trade, and thus at
least those individuals with β = 1 are better off.
Whether and by how much an individual benefits from trade also depends on the extent
to which the trade price differs from the autarky price. The trade price is determined
through supply and demand in general equilibrium, and thus depends on population
size, technology, and the distribution of preferences. With G(β) denoting the world
distribution of β and pT denoting the corresponding trade price, one gets the following
result:
Lemma 2.1
1. The equilibrium price pT is decreasing in LF and increasing in LH and axF .
2. For any two distribution functions G′(β) and G(β) with G′(β) ≥ G(β) for all β,
pT
′ ≥ pT .
An increase of the population in Foreign which leaves the distribution F (β) unaffected
decreases the equilibrium price, because it increases aggregate supply more than aggre-
gate demand. An increase of the population in Home, however, only increases aggregate
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demand, and thus leads to a higher equilibrium price. Furthermore, as axF increases,
production of good x gets less efficient and the equilibrium price rises, all other things
being equal. This simply follows from totally differentiating the goods market clearing
condition LH
∫
x(pT , β)dH(β) + LF
∫
x(pT , β)dF (β) = LF/axF . Note that the demand
for good x is independent of income for an interior solution because of the quasilinear
structure of preferences. Using that the world distribution of β is the weighted sum of the
distributions in Home and Foreign, G(β) = (LHH(β) + LFF (β)) /(LH +LF ), the goods
market clearing condition can be rewritten as (LH + LF )
∫
x(pT , β)dG(β) = LF/axF .
When the distribution changes from G(β) to G′(β) such that more people have less
self-control, aggregate demand increases, and ceteris paribus the equilibrium price must
rise.
Knowing how the equilibrium price pT depends on the parameters of the model, the next
step is to analyze how it affects the individual gains from trade.
Proposition 2.3
1. If the individual lives in Home and has β = 1, her gains are decreasing in pT . If
she has β < 1, her gains are decreasing in pT if and only if −x∗TH < (1− β)cx ∂x
∗T
H
∂pT
.
2. If the individual lives in Foreign, her gains are increasing in pT for all β ≤ 1.
In Home, a smaller equilibrium price pT has two effects. It increases the traditional gains
from trade as the imported good becomes cheaper, but it also worsens the inefficiency
due to overconsumption for those individuals who suffer from self-control problems, as
can be seen from the derivative ∂GH/∂p
T = −x∗TH −(1−β)cx∂x∗TF /∂pT . For an individual
with β < 1, both effects work into opposite directions, and the gains from trade are only
decreasing in pT if the traditional effect dominates the overconsumption effect. Overall,
the relationship between GH and p
T does not need to be monotonic. Like in the example
in section 2.4.4, it may happen that the gains from trade for an individual with self-
control problems first rise as pT falls, and then decline as pT moves further away from
the autarky price. For an individual with β = 1, the overconsumption effect vanishes
and ∂GH/∂p
T = −x∗TH < 0.
In Foreign, both effects work in the same direction, as can be seen from the derivative
∂GF/∂p
T =
(
1/axF − x∗TF
)− (1−β)cx∂x∗TF /∂pT . A larger equilibrium price pT increases
the traditional gains from trade as the exported good becomes more expensive,13 and
it reduces the inefficiency due to overconsumption. Thus, the gains from trade unam-
biguously rise with pT for all individuals in Foreign.
13Note that z∗TF = w
T
F − pTx∗TF = pT /axF − pTx∗TF = pT
(
1/axF − x∗TF
)
, using that marginal costs
must equal the price in equilibrium, wTFaxF = p
T . Hence, in a trade equilibrium where individual
consumption of z is positive and the individual welfare analysis in this chapter applies, it must be that
1/axF − x∗TF > 0.
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One may not only be interested in the individual gains from trade, but also in the gains
from trade for a country as a whole. However, without assuming a specific utility and
cost function and a particular distribution of β, it is difficult to make any statement
about the sign and the size of a country’s gains from trade, at least for Home. Clearly,
if all individuals in Home are fully self-controlled, the country’s gains from trade are
positive. Taking this as a starting point, one can think about what happens if more and
more individuals in Home suffer from self-control problems. This has two effects: First,
the equilibrium price pT rises, and second, the gains of individuals with lower β weigh
more heavily. A rising price unambiguously hurts those who are still fully self-controlled,
and given that individuals with self-control problems can never make higher gains than
those who are fully self-controlled as long as assumption 2.1 is satisfied, the country’s
gains from trade cannot rise as one moves from a situation with no self-control problems
to a situation where at least some individuals in Home have self-control problems. Yet,
comparing two different distributions of self-control problems in Home is impossible
without further information due to the fact that individuals with low self-control may
actually benefit from a rising price. The Foreign country’s gains from trade are always
positive, and if assumption 2.1 is satisfied, they are the higher the more individuals in
Foreign suffer from self-control problems.
However, even if the Home country’s gains from trade are negative, trade can be made
a Pareto-improvement. The government in Home just has to introduce a tariff on the
imported good x such that the consumer price under trade equals the autarky price,
and redistribute the tariff revenue in a lump sum fashion. In this case, the traditional
gains due to specialization are preserved, and losses due to increased overconsumption
are avoided. Thus, Pareto-gains from trade are possible, but they require government
action. Also note that a tariff on the sin good will reduce the equilibrium price in
Foreign, thereby reducing the gains that can be achieved abroad.
To illustrate the results derived in this section and to give an idea of how large the gains
or losses due to trade liberalization may in fact be, I will provide an example with a
concrete utility and cost function and feasible parameter values in the following section.
2.4.4 Example
Suppose v(x) = 2
√
x and c(x) = x for all individuals in Home and Foreign. Then the
interior solution to the decision utility maximization problem is x∗ = 1/(β + p)2 and
z∗ = w−p/(β+p)2. Using the equilibrium prices and wages in autarky and under trade,
an individual’s gains from trade in Home and Foreign can be calculated as
GH =
(
1
(β + pT )
− 1
(β + axHazH )
)
− (1− β)
(
1
(β + pT )2
− 1
(β + axHazH )
2
)
(2.8)
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GF =
(
1
(β + pT )
− 1
(β + axFazF )
+
pT
axF
− 1
azF
)
− (1− β)
(
1
(β + pT )2
− 1
(β + axFazF )
2
)
. (2.9)
The first part of each equation reflects the traditional gains, which are unambiguously
positive if each country fully specializes in its comparative advantage good and the in-
dividual consumes both goods x and z in autarky and under trade. The second part
describes the change in welfare due to a change in overconsumption, which is negative
in Home and positive in Foreign. Thus, in Foreign, all individuals unambiguously gain
from trade, while in Home, individuals with self-control problems may lose from trade if
the traditional gains are overcompensated by the welfare loss due to increased overcon-
sumption. Whether this will actually happen depends on the individual’s self-control
parameter β and on the equilibrium price pT , which solves the goods market clearing
condition and depends on the distribution of β in Home and in Foreign, the population
sizes LH and LF and the technology parameter axF .
I assume that the self-control parameter β is uniformly distributed on the interval [0.4, 1]
in Home and in Foreign. Empirical evidence on the distribution of the self-control para-
meter β is still limited. Most studies that estimate models with hyperbolic discounting
estimate a single β for the whole sample. For instance, Laibson et al. (2007) use a
consumption-savings model and estimate a β of about 0.7. Shui and Ausubel (2005)
take the results of an experiment in the credit-card market and estimate a present-
bias factor of 0.8, while Fang and Silverman (2007) implement a model of labor supply
and welfare participation and get an estimate for β of about 0.34. An exception is
Paserman (2008), who estimates the degree of hyperbolic discounting in a job search
model for different groups of workers. His estimate for β is 0.4 for low income workers
(1st quartile of the wage distribution), 0.48 for medium income workers (2nd and 3rd
quartile of the wage distribution), and 0.89 for high income workers (4th quartile of the
wage distribution). To sum up, even though most studies cannot reject the hypothesis
that individuals are hyperbolic discounters, the estimates vary considerably depending
on the model used and the assumptions made, and information about the distribution of
β that go beyond its mean are scarce. Therefore, a uniform distribution of β on [0.4, 1]
with mean 0.7 does not seem to be implausible.
The remaining parameter values have to be chosen such that (i) Foreign has a compar-
ative advantage in good x, (ii) the equilibrium price lies between the two autarky prices
pAF and p
A
H , and (iii) each individual with β ∈ [0.4, 1] in Home and Foreign has strictly
positive demand for x and z in autarky and under trade. One set of parameter values
that satisfies conditions (i) to (iii) is LH = 6, axH = 0.3, azH = 0.4, LF = 1, axF = 0.2
and azF = 0.4.
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For these parameter values, the gains from trade in Home and Foreign for individuals
with different degrees of self-control are displayed in figure 2.1. To ease interpretation,
they are indicated in percent of the individual’s experienced utility in autarky. A fully
β
GH  in %
GF  in %
β*=0.46
Figure 2.1: Individual gains in Home and Foreign
self-controlled individual in Home gains about 2.8% from trade. In other words, free
trade allows an individual with β = 1 to increase consumption of the composite good
by about 2.8%, all else being equal. The welfare gains are the lower, the stronger is
the self-control problem: an individual with β = 0.6 gains only about 1.6% from trade.
For an individual with β = β∗ = 0.46, the loss due to increased overconsumption and
the traditional gains exactly compensate, and an individual at the lower end of the
distribution loses by more than 1.2%. Given that the chosen utility function satisfies
assumption 2.1, it is not surprising that the individual gains from trade in Home are
increasing in β. In Foreign, the individual gains from trade are positive and decreasing
in β for all β ∈ [0.4, 1]. A fully self-controlled individual can consume about 3% more
of the composite good under trade than in autarky, while an individual at the lower end
of the distribution gains more than 3.8% from trade.
In addition to the self-control parameter β, the equilibrium price under trade is crucial
for an individual’s gains from trade. While the gains from trade are decreasing in pT for a
fully self-controlled individual in Home, the relationship is non-monotonic for individuals
with low self-control. Their gains, measured in percent of autarky experienced utility,
increase if the equilibrium price under trade falls only slightly below the autarky price
in Home, but decrease and eventually become negative if pT declines further, which
happens, for instance, if the population in Foreign grows.14
14For the given parameter values with LF = 1, the equilibrium price is pT = 0.52, and at this price
the gains from trade for an individual with β = β∗ = 0.46 have fallen to zero.
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β=0.46
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Figure 2.2: Individual gains in Home for different β as a function of pT .
Finally, with a uniform distribution of the self-control parameter β, the gains from trade
for a country as a whole are proportional to the area under the respective curve in figure
2.1. In this specific example, they are positive in both Home and Foreign.
2.5 New trade model
In the previous section, I have demonstrated that in a Ricardian model of trade with
constant returns to scale, perfect competition and time-inconsistent preferences, the wel-
fare consequences of trade crucially depend on the direction of trade. While individuals
in the country exporting the sin good unambiguously gain, individuals in the importing
country may lose. I will now turn to a new trade model, characterized by increasing
returns to scale and monopolistic competition, and show that in such a framework the
welfare implications might be different. First, individuals in both countries may lose
from trade, and second, even fully self-controlled individuals may lose if there is hetero-
geneity in the degree of self-control across countries.
2.5.1 Model description
Individuals have time-inconsistent preferences for two goods as described in section 2.3,
with the exception that good x is now a differentiated good with a continuum of varieties.
I denote consumption of variety i by x(i), with i ∈ [0, N ]. N is the mass of varieties and is
determined endogenously. As before, I denote consumption of the composite nume´raire
good by z. In each period, an individual supplies l units of labor inelastically and gets a
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labor income of wl. Hence, in each period, an individual chooses x(i), i ∈ [0, N ], and z
to maximize her decision utility u∗(x(i), i ∈ [0, N ] , z) = v(x(i), i ∈ [0, N ])− βc(x(i), i ∈
[0, N ]) + z subject to the budget constraint
∫ N
0
p(i)x(i)di + z = wl. Her welfare is
measured in terms of experienced utility, u∗∗(x(i), i ∈ [0, N ] , z) = v(x(i), i ∈ [0, N ]) −
c(x(i), i ∈ [0, N ]) + z.
To make the model analytically tractable, I assume a specific functional form for v(·)
and for c(·), i.e.
u∗(x(i), i ∈ [0, N ], z) = α
∫ N
0
x(i)di− 1
2
ρ
∫ N
0
x(i)2di− 1
2
η
(∫ N
0
x(i)di
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v(x(i),i∈[0,N ])
−β γ
∫ N
0
x(i)di︸ ︷︷ ︸
c(x(i),i∈[0,N ])
+z (2.10)
with α > 0 and ρ > η > 0. Similar functional forms for v(·) have been used for example
by Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The parameter α reflects
the intensity of preferences for the differentiated good relative to the composite good,
while ρ > η implies that the individual likes to spread consumption of good x over as
many varieties as possible. This love of variety is the greater, the higher is ρ. For a
given value of ρ, η describes the substitutability between varieties. They are the closer
substitutes, the higher is η. For the future costs of consumption, only the total amount
of the differentiated good matters. It is irrelevant how this amount is split between the
different varieties. To give an intuition for this assumption, note that for the probability
of getting lung cancer, it certainly matters how much an individual smokes. It seems
however secondary whether she smokes Marlboro, Camel or Lucky Strike cigarettes.
Similarly, whether an individuals becomes obese and suffers from diabetes might depend
on how many bars of chocolate she eats per day. Whether this is milk chocolate or white
chocolate is however less important.
I assume that labor supply and thus income are sufficiently large and that the preference
for the differentiated good is sufficiently strong, such that all individuals have positive
demand for each variety i ∈ [0, N ] and for the composite good.15 In this case, the
demand of an individual with self-control parameter β for each variety i ∈ [0, N ] is given
by
x(i) =
α− βγ
ρ+ ηN
+
ηNp¯
ρ(ρ+ ηN)
− p(i)
ρ
(2.11)
with p¯ = 1
N
∫ N
0
p(i)di being the average price of the differentiated good.
15Assumption 2.2 imposes restrictions on the parameters of the model which ensure that this will
indeed be the case in equilibrium.
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For the moment, I focus on a single country and assume that it is populated by a
continuum of individuals with mass L. These individuals may differ in their degree of
self-control, as described by the cumulative distribution function H(β). If all individuals
in the support of H(β) have a positive demand as given by equation (2.11), the aggregate
demand for each variety i ∈ [0, N ] is
X(i) = L
(
α− β¯γ
ρ+ ηN
+
ηNp¯
ρ(ρ+ ηN)
− p(i)
ρ
)
(2.12)
where β¯ =
∫
βdH(β) is the average β in the population.
As in the previous section, the nume´raire good z is produced with constant returns to
scale under perfectly competitive conditions. The units of good z are normalized such
that producing one unit of good z requires one unit of labor. This implies an equilibrium
wage of w = 1. Each variety i ∈ [0, N ] of the differentiated good is produced by a single
firm with zero marginal costs and fixed costs F . The firm chooses p(i) to maximize
profits, Π(i) = p(i)X(i) − F , taking the average price p¯ of the differentiated good and
the number of firms N as given. This is a central feature of monopolistic competition:
since there is a continuum of competitors, each firm has a negligible effect on the market,
and there is no direct strategic interaction. There is only indirect interaction through
the average price p¯, which influences the aggregate demand for the differentiated good
and thus for each variety. Another central feature of monopolistic competition, which is
assumed in the following, is free entry and exit of firms.
2.5.2 Autarky equilibrium
The definition of an autarky equilibrium is analogue to the one given in section 2.4.2,
with the exception that inputs, outputs and consumption allocations as well as prices
are now defined for each variety i ∈ [0, N ] of the differentiated good. Also, the market
clearing condition must hold for each variety i ∈ [0, N ]. Like prices, N is taken as given
by individuals and firms and will be determined endogenously in equilibrium as firms
can freely enter and exit the market.
Since the different varieties enter symmetrically into the utility function (2.10) and firms
have identical marginal costs of zero, each firms chooses the same profit maximizing
price, which depends on the number of competitors as well as on the average price for
the differentiated good,
p(i) =
ρ(α− β¯γ) + ηNp¯
2(ρ+ ηN)
for all i ∈ [0, N ] . (2.13)
Intuitively, if N increases, competition becomes fiercer, and the firm must lower its price.
If p¯ rises, substitutes become more expensive, and the firm can charge a higher price
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for its own product. This effect is the stronger, the closer are the substitutes. Due to
symmetry, p¯ = p(i) = p and (2.13) collapses to
p =
ρ(α− β¯γ)
2ρ+ ηN
. (2.14)
Aggregate demand for each variety at the profit maximizing price then is
X = L
α− β¯γ
2ρ+ ηN
. (2.15)
With free entry, firms must make zero profits in equilibrium, Π = pX − F = 0. Substi-
tuting in (2.14) and (2.15) and solving for N gives
N∗ =
(α− β¯γ)
√
ρL
F
− 2ρ
η
. (2.16)
The equilibrium mass of varieties increases if the intensity of preferences for the differen-
tiated good rises, if the average degree of self-control decreases, or if the population size
increases. All this might be interpreted as an increase in market size. Increasing fixed
costs however reduce the equilibrium mass of varieties. If they get too large relative to
market size, N will be zero in equilibrium. Plugging (2.16) back into (2.14) and (2.15)
gives the equilibrium price of each variety i ∈ [0, N ]
p∗ =
√
ρF
L
(2.17)
and the equilibrium aggregate consumption of each variety i ∈ [0, N ]
X∗ =
√
LF
ρ
. (2.18)
Note that both the equilibrium price and aggregate consumption of each variety are
independent of the average degree of self-control, β¯. They only depend on fixed costs
F , the parameter ρ, and the population size L. Individual consumption of each variety
will be a fraction L of aggregate consumption, corrected by a factor that accounts for
deviations from the average degree of self-control,
x∗ =
√
LF
ρ
(
(α− βγ)
√
ρL
F
− ρ
)
L
(
(α− β¯γ)
√
ρL
F
− ρ
) . (2.19)
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In equilibrium, an individual who has higher self-control than the average consumes less
of the sin good than the average, and vice versa. To ensure that all demands as well
as the equilibrium mass of varieties are positive and equations (2.16) to (2.19) indeed
characterize an autarky equilibrium, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.2 For all β in the support of H(β), the parameters of the model satisfy
the following conditions:
1. lη√
ρF
L
> α− βγ >
√
ρF
L
2. α− β¯γ > 2
√
ρF
L
The first condition ensures that x∗ > 0 and z∗ = l − N∗p∗x∗ > 0. The second pa-
rameter restriction guarantees that the equilibrium mass of varieties is positive. All
conditions can be satisfied if the fixed costs are sufficiently small relative to the intensity
of preferences for the differentiated good and if the individual labor supply is sufficiently
large.
The experienced utility in the autarky equilibrium, which depends on the individual
degree of self-control, is then given by
u∗∗ = N∗x∗
1
2
(α− βγ − p∗) + l︸ ︷︷ ︸
traditional part
− (1− β)γN∗x∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss due to overconsumption
. (2.20)
Similar to the Ricardian setting, it can be split into two parts, a traditional one and one
which reflects the reduction of well-being due to overconsumption and cancels for β = 1.
2.5.3 Welfare effects of trade liberalization
How to think about trade liberalization within this framework? The traditional way
is to look at two economies with identical preferences and production technologies and
interpret trade simply as an increase in the mass of consumers L that can be reached
by each firm. As borders open up, producers in both countries can serve the domestic
and the foreign market and take advantage of economies of scale in production. The
equilibrium price falls. At the same time, individuals in both countries gain access to
more varieties. Even though they consume less of a single variety, their overall consump-
tion of the differentiated good increases. Both the decreasing price and the increasing
choice benefit the fully self-controlled individuals. The traditional part of the experi-
enced utility is decreasing in p∗ and increasing in N∗x∗. Those individuals who suffer
from self-control problems may however be worse off in both countries, since they do
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not correctly take into account the increasing costs of consuming more of the differenti-
ated good, and their loss due to increased overconsumption may overcompensate their
conventional gains from trade.
Within the present framework, however, trade does not only have an impact on the size
of the market that is served by each firm. Given that already individuals within one
country are heterogeneous in their degree of self-control, it is very likely that the two
trading countries are characterized by different cumulative distribution functions. And
unless both cumulative distribution functions have the same mean, the average degree
of self-control in the open economy β¯T will be different from the average degrees of self-
control in the two closed economies. If the average self-control problem is more severe
in Foreign than in Home, that is β¯F < β¯, then β¯
T will be smaller than β¯. A smaller
average degree of self-control has a positive effect on aggregate demand, all else equal.
As a result, more varieties become available, and the total amount of the differentiated
good an individual in Home consumes increases. The effect of a decrease in the average
degree of self-control thus goes into the same direction as the effect of an increase in
market size. It benefits the fully self-controlled individuals in Home, while it may hurt
individuals with low self-control. However, if the average self-control problem is less
severe in Foreign than in Home, that is β¯F > β¯, then β¯
T will be larger than β¯, and
considered in isolation, this hurts the fully self-controlled individuals in Home, while it
may benefit those individuals that lack willpower. In combination with an increase in
the mass of consumers, the welfare consequences of trade are much more ambiguous and
depend on which of the two opposing effects dominates. Nevertheless, if β¯T is smaller
than or equal to β¯, one can find a sufficient condition for the individual gains from trade
in Home to be positive.
Proposition 2.4 Consider an individual with self-control parameter β living in a coun-
try in which the average degree of self-control is β¯. Suppose assumption 2.2 is satisfied in
autarky. If the country starts trading with another country in which the average degree
self-control is equal to or lower than β¯, the individual gains from trade if β ≥ 2− α−
√
ρF
L
γ
.
For a proof, see the appendix. Thus, individuals with sufficiently strong self-control gain
from trade, provided that the average degree of self-control is not higher in the country
they start trading with than in their own country. Their gains increase with the size of
the population in the foreign country. What the finding also suggests is that individuals
with low self-control can lose from trade, and for this to happen, it is irrelevant in
which of the two trading countries they live in if both countries are characterized by
similar distributions of self-control. In other words, with increasing returns to scale and
monopolistic competition, individuals with low self-control may lose from trade in both
countries, in contrast to the Ricardian setting, where at most individuals with low self-
control in the importing country can be worse off as borders open up. Another novelty
compared to the Ricardian setting is that a changing average degree of self-control opens
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up the possibility that in at most one country even the fully self-controlled individuals
lose from trade. The intuition behind this result is that if a country opens up its
borders to a country in which the average degree of self-control is very high and hence
demand for the sin good is rather low, firms have to reduce their prices considerably
to capture these new consumers. Since firms cannot price discriminate across countries,
their revenues fall despite a larger market size. This effect leads to less firms and hence
less varieties in the trade equilibrium, which hurts the fully self-controlled individuals. 16
However, numerical simulations indicate that the conditions for this to actually happen
are rather restrictive. In fact, the fully self-controlled individuals in Home can only lose
if the average degree of self-control in Foreign exceeds one, implying that the individuals
in Foreign are overly self-controlled and rather have a problem of underconsumption
than one of overconsumption, possibly not consuming the differentiated good at all in
autarky. Just to give an example, α = 15, γ = 10, β¯ = 0.75, L = 15, η = 10,
ρ = 20, F = 10, and l = 2 is a set of parameter values that satisfies assumption 2.2.
If in Foreign the average degree of self-control is β¯F = 1.2 and the population size is
LF = 10, then the average degree of self-control in the open economy is β¯
T = 0.93, and
the total population is LT = 25, implying that assumption 2.2 continues to hold under
trade. For these parameter values, a fully self-controlled individual in Home loses about
0.06% from trade in terms of experienced utility, or, to put it differently, in terms of
consumption of the nume´raire good. Hence, even if the parameter values are such that
losses indeed occur, they are quantitatively negligible, in particular if the expenditure
on the differentiated good represents only a small fraction of income, that is if l is large.
If the average degree of self-control is smaller than or equal to one in both Home and
Foreign, the fully self-controlled individuals on both sides of the border always gain
from trade. Given the empirical evidence on the distribution of self-control problems
summarized in section 2.4.4, this seems to be the more probable scenario.
2.6 Conclusion
The present paper has analyzed the consequences of time-inconsistent preferences for
the welfare effects of trade liberalization within two different trade models. In a classic
Ricardian model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition, it crucially
depends on the direction of trade whether an individual is better or worse off as borders
open up. In the exporting country, all individuals are better off, and they are the
16Note that the negative effect of trade liberalization on the number of varieties is not specific to a
situation in which there is heterogeneity across countries in the degree of self-control, but may occur
more generally whenever there is heterogeneity across countries in the preferences for the differentiated
good, as captured by α, or in the future costs of consumption, as reflected by γ. Opening up borders
to a country in which the average preference for the differentiated good is relatively low or the average
future cost of consumption is comparatively high can also lead to less firms and less varieties, and hence
make individuals in the country with high demand for the differentiated good worse off.
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better off, the higher is the equilibrium price of the sin good and the lower is their
degree of self-control. In the importing country however, while the fully self-controlled
individuals gain from trade, those individuals with self-control problems may lose from
trade, and this is more likely, the stronger is their self-control problem, provided that
they are sufficiently price-sensitive. These findings are however sensitive to changes in the
assumptions on production technology and market structure. In a new trade model with
increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition, the equilibrium price falls and
the variety of products available to consumers rises in both countries as borders open up,
provided that the average degrees of self-control in the two countries are similar. A lower
price and a larger variety benefit the fully self-controlled individuals, while they may
hurt consumers with a lack of willpower in both countries. Yet, the welfare consequences
are much more ambiguous if the distribution of self-control problems is heterogeneous
across countries. In particular, if a country starts trading with another country which
is inhabited by overly self-controlled individuals, then the fully rational individuals lose
if the negative effect of a rising average degree of self-control on the available product
variety dominates the positive effect of an increasing market size, while the individuals
with a lack of willpower may gain.
One real world example where self-control problems matter for the welfare effects of
trade and where government action is required to make trade a Pareto-improvement
over autarky is the case of trade in cigarettes. The empirical evidence on self-control
problems with regard to smoking is strong, and the effects of trade on the consumption
of cigarettes as well as the health consequences are well documented. Yet, the analysis
also qualifies for trade in other goods, such as unhealthy food, as mentioned in the
beginning, or alcohol. For instance, after Sweden joined the European Union in 1995,
it gradually liberalized trade in alcohol. The result were falling prices and an increased
variety, which are partly responsible for an upsurge in alcohol abuse in Sweden (Daley,
2001). Similarly, when Finland opened up its borders to Estonia in 2004 within the
framework of the expansion of the European Union, nearly unlimited amounts of low
priced alcohol became available, with adverse effects on Finish public health (Finish
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2006).
The preceding analysis suggests that in all of these cases, the welfare effects of trade
liberalization may be less positive than traditional models suggest. It provides a first
hint at which factors actually matter for the distribution of the gains from trade across
individuals and across countries when individuals have self-control problems and can
serve as a point of reference for policy recommendations.
Certainly, the analysis can be refined. So far, I have abstracted away from heterogeneity
in tastes, and this may be an important determinant of whether taxes or tariffs are
Pareto-improving, as O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) have shown. Possible extensions of
the model include the introduction of income effects, in combination with borrowings
and savings. Such effects might be rather irrelevant for smoking, but they are certainly
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important for more expensive goods such as illicit drugs. Including income effects does
however make a welfare analysis with time-inconsistent agents an even more serious issue,
given that utility units cannot simply be expressed in terms of income or a nume´raire
good. An alternative way to connect different periods of time is to remove the functional
separability between immediate benefits and future costs. This is for example what
Gruber and Ko¨szegi (2004) do when they analyze the welfare effects of taxes on addictive
goods. If consumption decisions of different periods are connected, it matters whether
individuals are aware of their self-control problem or not, and this may have interesting
implications also for trade. In addition, the connection between different periods of
time opens up the possibility for intertemporal trade, and this also seems worth to
analyze. Finally and most importantly, more empirical research is needed, especially
with respect to the distribution of the self-control parameter β within a population and
across countries, to determine how many individuals lose, and what is the magnitude of
their losses. To conclude, there is much need and room for further research, empirical
as well as theoretical, and taking into account new insights from behavioral economics
in international trade theory promises new results.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of proposition 2.4
Note that if assumption 2.2 is satisfied in autarky, i.e. for β¯ and L, it will also be satisfied
under trade, i.e. for β¯T = β¯L+β¯FLF
L+LF
≤ β¯ and LT = L+LF ≥ L where β¯F and LF denote
the average degree of self-control and the mass of consumers in the foreign country,
respectively. Then the gains from trade for an individual with self-control parameter β
are
G =
(
α− β¯Tγ − 2
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
− 2(1− β)γ
)
2η
(
α− β¯Tγ −
√
Fρ
LT
) (2.21)
−
(
α− β¯γ − 2
√
Fρ
L
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
L
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
L − 2(1− β)γ
)
2η
(
α− β¯γ −
√
Fρ
L
)
The derivative of G with respect to β¯F is
∂G
∂β¯F
= −
LFγ
√
Fρ
LT
(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
− 2(1− β)γ
)
2ηLT
(
α− β¯Tγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)2 (2.22)
and the derivative of G with respect to LF is
∂G
∂LF
=
Fρ
4η(LT )2
√
Fρ
LT
(
α− β¯Tγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)2 (2.23)
·
[(
α− β¯Tγ − 2
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− β¯Tγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)
+
(
α− β¯Tγ − 2
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− β¯Tγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
− 2(1− β)γ
)
+
(
α− β¯T + 2 (β¯ − β¯F ) Lγ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
)(
α− βγ −
√
Fρ
LT
− 2(1− β)γ
)]
If β ≥ 2 − α−
√
ρF
L
γ
, then β ≥ 2 − α−
q
ρF
L+LF
γ
for all LF ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
α− βγ −
√
ρF
LT
− 2(1− β)γ ≥ 0 and ∂G
∂β¯F
≤ 0. If, in addition, β¯F ≤ β¯, then all terms in
equation (2.23) are positive and ∂G
∂LF
> 0. Given that the gains from trade are zero for
β¯F = β¯ and LF = 0, they must be strictly positive for all β¯F ≤ β¯ and all LF > 0.
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Chapter 3
Endogenous trade policy with
heterogeneous firms
3.1 Introduction
There is by now a broad consensus among trade economists as well as political scientists
that trade policies are set by politicians who are subject to pressures applied by special
interest groups. In fact, lobbying for trade policy is a widely spread phenomenon.
Between 1998 and 2008, 84 % of all U. S. sectors at the 4-digit SIC level were engaged
in lobbying for trade policy, according to a recent dataset about lobbying expenditures
in the U. S. (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2009). The theoretical benchmark in this line
of literature is the “Protection for Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), in
which some organized sectors make political contributions to sway the government’s
trade policy choice in their favor. The incumbent government trades off social welfare
against these political contributions, and thus makes a trade policy choice that is biased
toward the interest of the lobbying sectors.
Even though the “Protection for Sale” model has found general empirical support,1 it
remains silent on a couple of interesting issues. Firstly, it focuses on a small open econ-
omy in which all sectors behave perfectly competitive and thus engage in inter-industry
trade only. By construction, it has nothing to say about the trade policy that would
emerge in an environment with imperfect competition and intra-industry trade. This
is however an important issue, given the prevalence of intra-industry trade in devel-
oped economies.2 Secondly, the model abstracts from the role of individual firms in the
1For a critical survey of the empirical evidence on the “Protection for Sale” model, see Imai et al.
(2009).
2According to Bru¨lhart (2009), the share of intra-industry trade in total trade as measured by the
Grubel-Lloyd index has been 0.32 in 2006 for high income countries, with industries being classified at
the 5-digit SITC level.
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political process. Yet, firms within a sector differ in their political activity, a fact that has
been discussed predominantly by political scientists. Larger firms, as measured by sales,
make higher contributions to political action committees in the U.S. (Bombardini, 2008;
Drope and Hansen, 2006; Sadrieh and Annavarjula, 2005 and others). In the European
Union context, they are more likely to have an office in Brussels and to be accredited
to lobby the European Parliament (Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2006). Smaller enterprises,
in contrast, are more reluctant to engage in the process of trade policy formation due
to financial constraints and lack of expertise (Fliess and Busquets, 2006). To the extent
that large and small firms differ in their preferences regarding trade policy, a purely
sectoral analysis may miss important determinants of the strength and the objective of
lobbying activities. Thirdly, like most of the theoretical contributions on the political
economy of trade policy, the analysis concentrates on import tariffs and export subsi-
dies as the relevant trade policy instruments. However, during decades of multilateral
trade negotiations, tariffs on manufacturing goods have fallen substantially. In 2007, the
unweighted average applied tariff rate in high income OECD countries was below 3%
(World Bank, 2009). At the same time, non-tariff barriers to trade such as technical bar-
riers or customs procedures and administrative practices have gained importance. The
use of technical barriers, for instance, has almost doubled from 1994 to 2004. In this
period, the percentage of tariff lines affected by technical barriers has risen from 32%
to 59% (UNCTAD, 2005). Recent empirical work by Chen and Novy (2008) suggests
that technical barriers to trade have a significantly negative impact on trade integra-
tion within the European Union. Explaining around 5% of the variation in bilateral,
industry-specific trade frictions, technical barriers are the most important policy-related
trade barrier. Together with undue administrative complications, technical barriers are
perceived by exporters around the world to be relevant obstacles to foreign market access
(OECD, 2005). After all, it has been argued that non-tariff barriers to trade are easier
to manipulate unilaterally and therefore more appropriate for a political economy setup
(Bombardini, 2008).
The present paper accounts for these facts and modifies the theoretical framework of
Grossman and Helpman (1994) to study the endogenous determination of non-tariff bar-
riers in a lobbying model with heterogeneous firms and intra-industry trade between two
asymmetric countries. The model is based on Chaney (2008) and similar to the one used
for a closed economy in Rebeyrol and Vauday (2009). In each country, there is a given
mass of firms producing varieties of a differentiated good with heterogeneous marginal
costs. In order to access the market and sell their products, both domestic producers and
foreign exporters have to incur some fixed costs. These costs are potentially different for
domestic producers and foreign exporters and may be interpreted as the costs of adapt-
ing the product to local standards, of testing and certifying the product, of complying
with legal requirements, or of passing customs and administrative procedures.
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Non-tariff barriers to trade are interpreted as additional regulations which raise these
fixed costs of gaining market access. Some regulations affect both foreign exporters
and domestic producers. Technical standards or labeling requirements, for example,
cannot be imposed on foreign exporters only, since the national treatment principle of
the WTO requires that once the imported goods have crossed the border, they must be
treated like locally produced goods. Such regulations will be referred to as “behind-the-
border measures”. They are assumed to leave the ratio of market access costs for foreign
exporters to market access costs for domestic producers unaffected. Other regulations,
such as customs and administrative procedures, affect foreign exporters only, and thus
raise the ratio of market access costs for foreign exporters to market access costs for
domestic producers. Such regulations will be referred to as “border measures”, since
they accrue when the imported goods pass the border.
When a country introduces behind-the-border measures, domestic firms and foreign ex-
porters with high marginal costs cannot generate enough revenues to cover the increased
fixed costs of accessing the country’s market anymore and exit. This reduces compe-
tition, and increases the market shares and profits of those domestic and foreign firms
with low marginal costs. In addition to this profit shifting effect within countries, there
is also a profit shifting effect across countries. In particular, profits will be shifted away
from the country that introduces behind-the-border measures whenever this country
has a smaller ratio of very efficient to very inefficient firms than its trading partner.
However, even if profits are shifted in the opposite direction, the introduction of behind-
the-border measures never increases social welfare in the country, since it reduces the
variety available to consumers. Yet, if only the largest and thus the most efficient firms
in the country engage in lobbying their government, as the empirical evidence suggests,
and if the government is sufficiently susceptible to political influence of domestic special
interest groups, it will nevertheless implement behind-the-border measures. The equilib-
rium level of technical standards or labeling requirements will be the larger, the stronger
the profit shifting effect between domestic firms, and the lower the government’s concern
about the social welfare in its country.
When a country introduces border measures, it drives the least efficient foreign firms out
of its market. Domestic firms are shielded from foreign competition, and this induces
some domestic firms that have formerly been inactive to start producing and selling their
goods. No domestic firm loses, and the aggregate profits of all domestic firms increase.
Nevertheless, like behind-the-border measures, border measures reduce consumer sur-
plus, and a government would never introduce such measures if it solely cared about
the social welfare in its country. If the largest domestic firms lobby, however, this may
be different. If the most efficient domestic firms gain enough from protection, and are
willing to exert a strong political influence, the government will implement the high-
est possible level of border measures. On the contrary, if the lobbying firms gain only
little, and the government cares a lot about social welfare, it will never implement any
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border measures at all. In contrast to behind-the-border measures, border measures do
not provoke any conflict of interest between domestic firms, and intermediate levels of
border measures will never obtain.
Although the literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade is growing fast, it
has so far paid little attention to the issue of endogenous trade policy. Four recent contri-
butions stand out. Bombardini (2008) extends the traditional Grossman and Helpman
(1994) setup by assuming that each sector is composed of several firms which differ in
their endowments with a sector specific factor of production. Firms with a larger en-
dowment produce more, sell more and thus have a stronger incentive to lobby for either
import tariffs or export subsidies. Yet, trade is still inter-industry, and there are no
conflicts of interest within sectors. This is different in Chang and Willmann (2006),
who introduce lobbying into a Melitz (2003) type model of intra-industry trade in which
firms are heterogeneous in their productivities. The most productive firms operate on
the export market and oppose a reciprocal import tariff since it would reduce their
profits made abroad, while the least productive ones sell on the domestic market only
and favor an import tariff since it would shield their market from foreign competition.
Neither Bombardini (2008) nor Chang and Willmann (2006) consider non-tariff barriers
to trade as the relevant policy variables. Do and Levchenko (2009) analyze the determi-
nation of the fixed costs of producing for the domestic market, which they interpret as
the quality of institutions, in a modified median voter model. The political mechanism
is thus different from the one considered here. Also, the fixed costs of producing for
the export market are exogenous in their model. The work most closely related to the
present paper deals with the endogenous determination of an entry tax in a model with
heterogeneous firms and product differentiation. Rebeyrol and Vauday (2009) however
focus on a closed economy. They argue informally that in a small open economy a tax
on the fixed costs for both foreign exporters and domestic firms, which is equivalent to
the behind-the-border measures considered here, would shift profits toward foreign firms
if these were more productive on average. Further, they argue that if foreign firms were
less productive on average, it would be optimal to introduce a positive entry tax even
in the absence of lobbying. The formal analysis provided in the present paper qualifies
their intuition, for a large as well as for a small open economy. In addition, by analyzing
border measures, the present paper in principle allows for differential “entry taxes” for
foreign and domestic producers, and it also addresses the question of endogenous lobby
formation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the basic model.
Section 3.3 introduces behind-the-border and border barriers as the relevant trade policy
instruments and analyzes their effects on individual and aggregate profits and social
welfare. Section 3.4 presents the lobbying game and analyzes the equilibrium trade
policies. Section 3.5 deals with possible extensions of the model, including endogenous
lobby formation, and section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 The model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. Whenever necessary, variables are indexed
by H or F . In both countries there is a continuum of consumers with mass LH and LF ,
respectively, who share identical preferences over a composite nume´raire good CA and
a continuum of varieties of a manufacturing good CM described by a quasilinear utility
function of the form
U = CA + µ ln CM CM =
(∫
c
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
(3.1)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the differentiated
good. The utility function implies that all else equal, the consumer likes to spread
consumption of the manufacturing good over as many varieties as possible. The model
can easily be extended to more than one manufacturing sector by using an additively
separable utility function like Grossman and Helpman (1994). Since this rules out cross-
price effects, and since the quasilinear structure of preferences rules out income effects,
it would still be an almost partial equilibrium model that could be analyzed sector by
sector.
Assuming that the income of each consumer is larger than the expenditures for the
manufacturing good, which are constant and equal to µ, the individual demand for any
imported or locally produced variety i is
ci =
µ p−σi
P 1−σ
(3.2)
where pi is the consumer price and P =
(∫
p1−σi di
) 1
1−σ is the ideal price index over all
consumed varieties. As more varieties become available, the ideal price index decreases,
and the demand for any single variety falls.
Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor, which is the only factor of pro-
duction. The nume´raire good is produced under perfectly competitive conditions with
constant returns to scale in both countries and is freely traded. One unit of output
requires one unit of input, which fixes the wage rate at one. The differentiated good is
produced with increasing returns to scale under monopolistically competitive conditions,
implying that each variety is produced at most by one firm and no firm produces more
than one variety. Firms differ in their marginal costs. A firm i producing variety i for
its domestic market incurs marginal costs ai. Trade in the differentiated good is subject
to Iceberg trade costs. In order for one unit to arrive in Foreign, a firm i in Home has
to ship τF > 1 units of its variety, implying that its marginal costs of producing for the
Foreign market are τFai . The analogous holds for a firm i in Foreign, with τH − 1 > 0
denoting the Iceberg trade costs from Foreign to Home. Profit maximization implies
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that a firm charges a constant markup σ
σ−1 over its marginal costs. Accordingly, the
consumer price for a locally produced variety is pi =
σ
σ−1 ai, while it is pi =
σ
σ−1 τHai for
an imported variety in Home and pi =
σ
σ−1 τFai for an imported variety in Foreign.
If a firm wants to sell its variety in its country of origin, it has to comply with domestic
product market regulations such as technical standards, testing and certification proce-
dures, or legal requirements. This creates fixed costs, which are denoted by fHD for a
Home firm and by fFD for a Foreign firm. If a firm wants to export its product, it has to
comply with the product market regulations in the target country. In addition, it has to
pass certain customs and administrative routines at the border. Altogether, exporting
creates fixed costs, which are denoted by fHE for a Home firm, and by fFE for a Foreign
firm.
Using profit maximizing consumer prices and the corresponding aggregate demands, the
profits of a Home firm with marginal costs ai from selling on its domestic market are
piHD(ai) =
µ
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
LHP
σ−1
H a
1−σ
i − fHD (3.3)
while its profits from exporting are
piHE(ai) =
µ
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
LFP
σ−1
F (τFai)
1−σ − fHE (3.4)
where PH denotes the ideal price index in Home, and PF denotes the ideal price index
in Foreign. Analogous expressions follow for a Foreign firm. The higher a Home firm’s
marginal cost, the less it sells on its domestic market. If a firm’s marginal costs are too
high, the net revenues from being active on the domestic market are too small to cover
the associated fixed costs, and the firm will exit. Thus, there is a cutoff level of marginal
costs aHD, implicitly defined by piHD(aHD) = 0, such that only Home firms with ai ≤ aHD
are active on their domestic market. Similarly, only Home firms with ai ≤ aHE export
their products and make non-negative profits on the Foreign market, where aHE is given
by piHE(aHE) = 0. The corresponding cutoff values for Foreign firms are denoted by aFD
and aFE, respectively.
To make the model suitable for a political economy setup, I assume that there is a fixed
mass of potential firms MH in Home and MF in Foreign.
3 Potential firms in Home draw
their marginal costs a ∈ (0, a¯H ] from the cumulative distribution function
H(a) =
(
a
a¯H
)κ
(3.5)
3The assumption of a fixed mass of potential entrepreneurs has also been used by Chaney (2008),
Arkolakis (2008), and Do and Levchenko (2009), amongst others.
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while firms in Foreign draw their marginal costs a ∈ (0, a¯F ] from the cumulative distri-
bution function
F (a) =
(
a
a¯F
)κ
(3.6)
with κ + 1 − σ > 0, a standard regularity condition. The distribution of marginal
costs a is equivalent to a Pareto distribution of marginal productivities 1/a with shape
parameter κ and scale parameters a¯H or a¯F , respectively. Using a Pareto distribution
for marginal productivities is now quite common in the literature on heterogeneous
firms, since it is in line with the empirical evidence on firm sales and ensures analytical
tractability.4 A possible generalization of the marginal cost distributions would be to
allow not only for different scale parameters a¯H and a¯F , but also for different shape
parameters κH and κF . I will comment on this generalization whenever it generates
additional insights. For the rest, I will content myself with the assumption of identical
shape parameters and model differences in average productivities across countries with
different scale parameters. This does not change the conclusions qualitatively, eases
exposition, permits closed form solutions and fosters intuition.
With the distributions of marginal costs given in (3.5) and (3.6), I can explicitly solve for
the price index in Home as a function of the mass of potential firms in both countries,MH
and MF , the population size LH , the size of the fixed costs fHD and fFE, the preference
parameter σ and the distribution parameters κ, a¯H , and a¯F . The price index in Foreign
follows analogously. This gives closed form solutions for the cutoff values aHD, aHE,
aFD, and aFE, and for the individual profits of Home and Foreign firms from selling on
their domestic and export market as a function of their marginal cost parameter a. All
solutions are given in the appendix. Aggregating individual profits from selling on the
Home market over all active Home firms gives
piaggHD =MH
∫ aHD
0
piHD(a)dH(a) = LH
µ
κ
σ − 1
σ
(
1 +
MF
MH
(
fFE
fHD
)κ+1−σ
1−σ
(
a¯H
τH a¯F
)κ)−1
(3.7)
while aggregating individual profits from selling on the Foreign market over all exporting
Home firms yields
piaggHE =MH
∫ aHE
0
piHE(a)dH(a) = LF
µ
κ
σ − 1
σ
(
1 +
MF
MH
(
fFD
fHE
)κ+1−σ
1−σ
(
τF a¯H
a¯F
)κ)−1
(3.8)
Exchanging H and F in equations (3.7) and (3.8) gives the corresponding expressions
for the aggregate profits of Foreign firms. As it turns out, Pareto distributions with
4Examples for papers that use a Pareto distribution for marginal productivities include Chaney
(2008), Arkolakis (2008), Baldwin and Forslid (2010), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), and Helpman et al.
(2004). For the empirical evidence, see Axtell (2001) and Corcos et al. (2007).
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identical shape parameters have the convenient feature that the sum of aggregate profits
of both Home and Foreign firms from selling on a specific market, e. g. the Home market,
is constant. In particular, it is independent of the fixed costs of gaining access to this
market,
piaggHD + pi
agg
FE = LH
µ
κ
σ − 1
σ
(3.9)
piaggFD + pi
agg
HE = LF
µ
κ
σ − 1
σ
. (3.10)
I assume that firms do not have sources of income other than profits, and that they spend
all of their profits on the nume´raire good. This ensures that their interest in lobbying
solely comes from their role as producers and not from their role as consumers. Thus,
they do not care about prices in sectors other than their own. A comparable assumption
to simplify the traditional Grossman and Helpman (1994) setup has been advocated by
Bombardini (2008) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), for instance. Social welfare
in the Home country is then given by the sum of the aggregate profits of Home firms
from selling on their domestic market and from exporting, aggregate labor income, and
total consumer surplus,
W = piaggHD + pi
agg
HE + LH + LH
(
µ ln
µ
PH
− µ
)
. (3.11)
3.3 Trade policy instruments
The government in Home may implement two different types of non-tariff barriers to
trade, namely behind-the-border measures, such as technical barriers to trade, and bor-
der measures, such as customs procedures. In this section, I will analyze the effects
of these two different measures on individual and aggregate profits of Home firms and
consumer welfare to point out the heterogeneity of preferences over these two trade pol-
icy variables, and to identify the social welfare maximizing choice. How the level of
protection is ultimately determined in the lobbying game will be the subject of section
3.4.
3.3.1 Behind-the-border measures
Behind-the-border measures are understood as regulations which increase the fixed costs
for both Home and Foreign firms of accessing the Home market, fHD and fFE, by a factor
α ∈ (1, α¯].5 Such regulations have an anti-competitive effect in that they force the least
5The assumption of multiplicative behind-the-border measures is mainly made for reasons of ana-
lytical tractability. If accessing the Home market is more difficult for Foreign exporters than for Home
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efficient Home producers and Foreign exporters to withdraw from the Home market.
Their marginal costs are too high and hence their sales too low to cover the increased
fixed costs. The more comprehensive these additional regulations, the more firms have
to exit. The benchmark case in which α = 1 characterizes a situation in which the Home
government does not implement any undue regulations at all.
Lemma 3.1 Behind-the-border measures force the least efficient Home and Foreign
firms that have been active on the Home market to exit, ∂aHD(α)
∂α
< 0 and ∂aFE(α)
∂α
< 0 for
all α ≥ 1.
This follows from multiplying the fixed costs fHD and fFE in the cutoff values aHD
and aFE with α and taking the respective derivatives. As the least efficient firms exit
the Home market, the available product variety shrinks and the price index in Home
increases, ∂PH(α)
∂α
> 0. Equation (3.3) for Home firms and the analog of equation (3.4)
for Foreign firms show that this increase in the price index PH benefits the remaining
firms the more the smaller their marginal costs. For the most efficient Home and Foreign
firms, the gain in market share due to reduced competition more than compensates the
increase in fixed costs, and their profits rise at the expense of the profits of the least
efficient Home and Foreign firms. This profit shifting effect is illustrated in figure 3.1
for Home firms, with a similar picture applying to Foreign firms.
Thus, behind-the-border measures shift profits from the least efficient Home firms to the
most efficient Home firms, and from the least efficient Foreign exporters to the most effi-
cient Foreign exporters. From a social welfare perspective, we might also be interested in
whether such measures also shift profits across borders, that is from Foreign exporters to
Home firms. This is however not the case, at least if both countries are characterized by
cost distributions with identical shape parameters. Inspection of equation (3.7) reveals
that with identical shape parameters, any behind-the-border measures which increase
the fixed costs fHD and fFE by the same factor cancel out and thus have no impact on
the sum of all profits made by Home firms. The social welfare maximizing policy simply
is to implement no behind-the-border measures at all, since any other policy would just
raise the price index, and hence reduce consumer surplus. Thus, the assumption of iden-
tical shape parameters allows me to abstract from technical barriers to trade which are
introduced by the Home government for any reason other than giving in to the pressure
of lobbying groups. Moreover, it has the interesting implication that if the differentiated
firms, fFE > fHD, which is quite plausible due to informational disadvantages, cultural differences, or
language barriers, this assumption implies that the absolute costs of complying with a new technical
standard are higher for Foreign exporters. Hence, in absolute terms, behind-the-border measures have
a discriminatory effect against Foreign firms, and in this respect may be seen as a protectionist trade
policy. An alternative way would be to model behind-the-border measures as regulations which impose
the same absolute cost on both Foreign exporters and Home firms. Additive behind-the-border mea-
sures would generally create the same conflict of interest between large and small firms. However, if
fFE > fHD, they would unintentionally increase the relative competitiveness of Foreign exporters and
thus would hurt rather than protect Home firms.
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to most efficient Home firms
Figure 3.1: Effect of behind-the-border measures on the profits of Home firms
good sector analyzed here was considered as an entity as in the original Grossman and
Helpman (1994) model, it would have no interest whatsoever in lobbying for non-tariff
barriers to trade like technical standards. The incentive to lobby arises only on the firm
level, and any bias in the equilibrium trade policy will solely be driven by heterogeneous
lobbying activities of large and small firms.
However, for completeness, and since it is an interesting result that relates well to the
literature, I will briefly discuss how behind-the-border measures shift profits across coun-
tries characterized by cost distributions with different shape parameters κH and κF .
Proposition 3.1 Behind-the-border measures shift aggregate profits from selling on the
Home market from Foreign to Home firms if and only if the distribution of firms is more
skewed in Foreign than in Home, that is
∂piaggHD (α)
∂α
> 0 and
∂piaggFE (α)
∂α
< 0 if and only if
κH < κF .
For a proof, see the appendix. Interestingly, whether profits from selling on the Home
market are shifted from Foreign to Home firms depends only on the shape parameters κH
and κF , and not on the scale parameters a¯H and a¯F . This is because the scale parameters
a¯H and a¯F affect the relevant cutoff values in Home and Foreign in the same way, and
thus lead to the same ratio of winners to losers in Home and Foreign. However, different
shape parameters κH and κF give winners and losers a different weight. If κH < κF ,
then the ratio of very efficient firms to rather inefficient firms and hence the ratio of
winners to losers from behind-the-border measures is higher in Home than in Foreign,
implying that in the aggregate, profits are shifted from Foreign to Home firms.
An interesting implication of this result is that the average of marginal costs of Home and
Foreign firms, given by
∫ a¯H
0
a dH(a) = κH
κH+1
a¯H and
∫ a¯F
0
a dF (a) = κF
κF+1
a¯F , respectively,
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cannot predict the direction of the profit shifting effect of behind-the-border measures.
It is quite possible that potential Foreign firms have lower marginal costs and hence are
more productive on average because a¯F is comparably small, but profits are nevertheless
shifted toward Home firms.6 This qualifies the result of Rebeyrol and Vauday (2009)
who argue by means of a rather restrictive example that behind-the-border measures
would shift profits to Home firms only if these were more productive on average.7
Moreover, Rebeyrol and Vauday (2009) argue that if an entry tax would shift profits to
Home firms, it could be optimal to introduce a positive entry tax even in the absence of
lobbying. This is true because an entry tax, contrary to the behind-the-border measures
considered here, generates tax revenues. In the absence of such revenues, however, the
implementation of purely anti-competitive regulations like behind-the-border measures
can never be social welfare maximizing.
Proposition 3.2 For any values of κH and κF , the introduction of behind-the-border
measures reduces social welfare in Home, ∂W (α)
∂α
< 0 for all α ≥ 1.
See the appendix for a proof, which shows that the potentially positive effect of behind-
the-border measures on the aggregate profits of Home firms is always dominated by their
negative effect on consumer surplus.
3.3.2 Border measures
Border measures are regulations set by the Home government which increase the fixed
costs fFE for Foreign exporters by a factor β ∈ (1, β¯]. To give an example, the govern-
ment may increase the number of documents required to obtain an import license or it
may extend the time needed to pass the authorization process at the border. Anecdo-
tal evidence of such measures, which clearly discriminate against foreign exporters and
which are largely unrelated to the quantity shipped, abounds.8 And recent empirical
6This argument also holds if the average of marginal costs is conditioned on being active on the
Home market. In other words, even if active Foreign exporters are more productive on average,∫ aHD
0
a dH(a) =
κH
κH + 1
f
1
1−σ
HD >
κF
κF + 1
f
1
1−σ
FE τ
−1
H =
∫ aFE
0
a dF (a),
because fHD is small compared to fFE , it is still possible that behind-the-border measures shift aggregate
profits from selling to the Home market from Foreign to Home firms.
7Their argument is actually made for Home being a small open economy. Yet, it carries over to
Home being a large open economy, since the only difference is whether Home firms have an impact
on the Foreign price index or not. The Foreign price index is however irrelevant for the profit shifting
effects of behind-the-border measures. For a model of a small open economy involved in intra-industry
trade, see Demidova and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2009).
8The European Commission’s Market Access Database, for instance, lists not only undue customs
procedures but also technical barriers to trade which impede European exports to third countries.
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work suggests that they may indeed have economically and statistically significant neg-
ative effects on trade flows. In a gravity equation, Wilson (2007) estimates the elasticity
of exports with respect to the number of documents and signatures required by the im-
porter, and with respect to the days the goods need to cross the border. His estimates
are −0.41, −0.88 and −0.96, respectively, indicating that a 10% increase in the number
of documents required would entail a 4% reduction of trade flows, for instance.
What is the effect of border measures in the present model? They shield domestic
producers from Foreign competition, since small Foreign exporters are not able to cover
the increased fixed costs any more and hence stop selling their varieties on the Home
market. This induces Home firms that have formerly been inactive to start producing
for the Home market. Again, β = 1 characterizes the benchmark situation without any
undue border measures.
Lemma 3.2 Border measures force the least efficient Foreign exporters to withdraw from
the Home market and induce less efficient Home firms to start producing for the Home
market, ∂aFE(β)
∂β
< 0 and ∂aHD(β)
∂β
> 0 for all β ≥ 1.
This follows from multiplying the fixed costs fFE in the cutoff values aFE and aHD with
β and taking the respective derivatives. As the positive effect of border measures on
the mass of active Home firms is only secondary, the overall product variety available in
Home decreases and hence the price index in Home increases, ∂PH(β)
∂β
> 0. As before, the
anti-competitive effect of border measures benefits the most efficient Foreign exporters.
Their gain in market share overcompensates the rise in fixed costs, and their profits
increase at the expense of the profits of the small Foreign exporters. In Home, all
firms gain, and they gain the more the smaller their marginal costs, as illustrated in
figure 3.2. Contrary to the case of behind-the-border measures, border measures do not
provoke any conflict of interest among Home firms. However, since large firms gain more,
their willingness to make campaign contributions in order to bring the government to
implement a certain trade policy β > 1 is larger, and hence their political influence is
stronger.
Inspection of equations (3.7) and (3.9) confirms that the aggregate profits of Home
firms from selling on the domestic market rise, at the expense of the aggregate profits
of Foreign exporters. However, even if border measures unambiguously raise aggregate
profits of Home firms, their impact on social welfare is negative.
Proposition 3.3 For any values of κH and κF , the introduction of border measures
reduces social welfare in Home, ∂W (β)
∂β
< 0 for all β ≥ 1.
See the appendix for a proof. Intuitively, as the decline in the mass of varieties imported
from Foreign is only partially offset by the increase in the mass of varieties produced at
Home, consumers are worse off, and their loss in utility outweighs the gain in aggregate
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Figure 3.2: Effect of border measures on the profits of Home firms
profits. Thus, the social welfare maximizing policy is to introduce no border measures
at all. Again, any bias toward protectionist measures can only be due to the lobbying
activities of some Home firms.
3.4 Lobbying
In principle, the theoretical framework is appropriate to model lobbying on both trade
policy instruments jointly. However, allowing behind-the-border measures and border
measures to be determined simultaneously does not add much insight, and blurs the
main intuition. Therefore, I will consider lobbying on only one trade policy at a time,
and I will start and introduce the political game with behind-the-border measures.
3.4.1 Theoretical framework
Like Grossman and Helpman (1994), I model the lobbying process as a menu auction
based on the theoretical framework of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). I assume that
Home firms are organized exogenously into j ∈ K lobbies. At this point, I will make
no specific assumption on the composition of the lobbies. Each lobby acts as a bidder
and makes a menu of offers to the Home government, one for each level of behind-the-
border measures that the Home government may choose. Put differently, each lobby
announces political contributions Cj(α) contingent on the level of behind-the-border
measures α ∈ [1, α¯] that the Home government implements. The objective of each lobby
is to maximize the joint welfare of its members net of contributions,
48 CHAPTER 3. ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY
Gj(α) =Wj(α)− Cj(α) = pijHD(α) + pijHE − Cj(α). (3.12)
The Home government acts as an auctioneer. It takes the bids of the lobbies as given,
and chooses behind-the-border measures α ∈ [1, α¯] to maximize a weighted sum of social
welfare in Home and the lobbies’ political contributions,
G(α) = φW (α) +
∑
j∈K
Cj(α) (3.13)
The higher φ, the more the Home government cares about social welfare and the less it
is susceptible to the pressure of lobbying firms.
3.4.2 Timing
The timing of the lobbying game is as follows. First, Home and Foreign firms draw their
marginal costs a from the distributions H(a) and F (a), respectively. Second, Home
firms organize exogenously into lobbies. Third, each lobby j ∈ K offers a contribution
for each possible level of α, Cj(α), to maximize its welfare net of contributions, Gj(α).
The Home government takes the contribution schedules as given and chooses α ∈ [1, α¯]
to maximize G(α). It implements the chosen trade policy and receives the corresponding
contributions. Then all Home and Foreign firms produce for all markets on which they
can make non-negative profits, and withdraw from markets on which they would make
losses given the actual level of behind-the-border measures.
3.4.3 Equilibrium
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that the equilibrium of the lobbying game, if set
up as a menu auction, can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3.4 (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986)
{
Coj (α)j∈K , α
o
}
is a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game if and only if
(a) Coj (α) is feasible for all j ∈ L
(b) αo maximizes φW (α) +
∑
j∈K C
o
j (α) on [1, α¯]
(c) αo maximizes φW (α) +
∑
j∈K C
o
j (α) +Wj(α)− Coj (α) on [1, α¯] for every j ∈ K.
(d) for every j ∈ K there exists an αj ∈ [1, α¯] that maximizes φW (α) +∑i∈K Coi (α) on
[1, α¯] such that Coj (α
j) = 0
Condition (a) implies that each lobby’s contribution schedule must not be negative, nor
larger than the total income of the lobby’s members. Condition (b) captures the fact
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that the Home government implements the trade policy α ∈ [1, α¯] that maximizes its
own welfare, which is a weighted sum of the social welfare in Home and the political
contributions. Condition (c) ensures that the equilibrium trade policy αo maximizes
the joint surplus of the government and any lobby j. If this were not the case, lobby j
could modify its contribution schedule to increase the joint surplus and keep a fraction
of the additional gain. And finally, condition (d) states that each lobby j contributes
just enough to make the government indifferent between the equilibrium policy αo and
the policy it would choose if lobby j did not participate in the lobbying game.
A common problem of lobbying games is the multiplicity of equilibrium contribution
schedules. However, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that the set of a lobby’s best
responses to any combination of contribution schedules offered by all other lobbies always
includes a truthful contribution schedule. Such a schedule reflects the true preferences
of the lobby in every point α ∈ [1, α¯] and stipulates a payment to the government which
equals the excess welfare of the lobby at α relative to some basic level Bj. Formally, a
truthful contribution schedule of lobby j is given by
CTj (α,Bj) = max[0,Wj(α)−Bj]. (3.14)
It is differentiable everywhere, except where it becomes nil, as long as the lobby’s total
profits are differentiable. Further, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that all truth-
ful Nash equilibria, that is all equilibria which are supported by truthful contribution
schedules, and only these equilibria, are coalition-proof, which makes them focal among
the set of all Nash equilibria. Truthful Nash equilibria have the compelling property
that the equilibrium policy αo satisfies
αo = arg maxα∈[1,α¯]
[
φW (α) +
∑
j∈K
Wj(α)
]
. (3.15)
Effectively, the Home government maximizes a social welfare function in which organized
Home firms are weighted with 1 + φ, while non-organized firms and consumers are only
weighted with φ. Given their useful properties, I will concentrate on truthful Nash
equilibria in the following. Note, however, that the necessary condition for an equilibrium
policy in the interior of [1, α¯],
φ
∂W (αo)
∂α
+
∑
j∈K
∂Wj(α
o)
∂α
= 0, (3.16)
applies even if contributions schedules are not globally truthful, as long as they are
differentiable around the equilibrium point αo. This follows from combining equilibrium
conditions (b) and (c).
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3.4.3.1 Behind-the-border measures
In line with the empirical evidence, I assume that only the largest, hence the most
efficient firms will engage jointly in lobbying for behind-the-border measures. This seems
plausible, as they have an aligned interest in behind-the-border measures, and gain most
from their introduction. In addition, even though I do not explicitly model this here,
forming a lobby may involve fixed costs as in Bombardini (2008), and only firms with
low marginal costs and high profits may be able to bear these costs.
Assumption 3.1 In the differentiated goods sector, all Home firms with a ∈ (0, aL] are
organized into a single lobby L, with aL < aHD(α=1, β=1). All Home firms with a > aL
do not engage in lobbying.
Thus, I assume that there is only one lobby, and that its composition is given exoge-
nously. I will rationalize this assumption and discuss the possibility of endogenizing the
lobby formation process in section 3.5.3. The lobby’s welfare is the joint welfare of its
members and given by WL(α) = pi
L
HD(α) + pi
L
HE. The lobby’s profits from exporting are
independent of α, while the lobby’s profits from selling on the domestic market are given
by
piLHD(α) =
 MH
(
aL
a¯H
)κ(
µ
σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
PH(α)σ−1LHa1−σL
κ
κ+1−σ − αfHD
)
if α < αL
piaggHD if α ≥ αL
(3.17)
For all α < αL, the lobby’s profits from selling on the Home market are increasing
and concave in α. As α increases, however, the cutoff value aHD(α) declines. At αL,
the cutoff value coincides with the marginal costs of the least efficient lobby member,
aHD(αL) = aL, and the lobby consist of all Home firms which are active on the domestic
market. Consequently, for all α ≥ αL, the lobby’s profits coincide with the aggregate
profits of Home firms from selling on the domestic market. Since the gains of the largest
firms in the lobby exactly offset the losses of the smallest members of the lobby, the
lobby’s total profits do not depend on α anymore.
With only the largest firms participating in the lobbying game, the following result
regarding the equilibrium level of behind-the-border measures holds:
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that assumption 3.1 is satisfied and contribution schedules
are truthful. Further, suppose that φ∂W (α)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α)
∂α
> 0 at α = 1 and that αL < α¯.
Then there exists a unique equilibrium level of behind-the-border measures αo in the
interior of [1, α¯] which is characterized by φ∂W (α
o)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α
o)
∂α
= 0.
For a proof, see the appendix. If φ∂W (α)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α)
∂α
> 0 at α = 1, the lobby’s marginal
gain in profits and hence the Home governments marginal gain in political contributions
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is higher than the weighted marginal loss in social welfare from introducing behind-the-
border measures, and the Home government has an incentive to deviate from the socially
optimal policy. This is always the case if the price index in Home is sufficiently high,
since Foreign firms are rather inefficient or variable trade costs are high, for instance,
or if the weight on social welfare φ is sufficiently low. As α increases, however, the
marginal gain in political contributions declines, and at some point becomes smaller
than the weighted marginal loss in social welfare. This point characterizes the unique
interior equilibrium level of behind-the-border measures.
Using the derivative of social welfare (3.11) and of the lobby’s profits (3.17) with respect
to α, and taking into account that the elasticity of the price index with respect to α,
PH ,α, is equal to
κ+1−σ
(σ−1)κ , the first order condition φ
∂W (αo)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α
o)
∂α
= 0 can be rewritten
as
−φµLH
αo
κ+ 1− σ
(σ − 1)κ +MH
(
aL
a¯H
)κ(µ
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
PH(αo)σ−1
LH
αo
a1−σL − fHD
)
= 0. (3.18)
Applying the implicit function theorem and using the first and second order condition
for an interior maximum gives the following comparative static result:
Proposition 3.6 The equilibrium level of behind-the-border measures which results from
the lobbying game in Home, αo, is increasing in the fixed costs of gaining access to the
Home market for Foreign firms, fFE, the variable trade costs from Foreign to Home,
τH , and the scale parameter of the distribution of marginal costs in Foreign, a¯F . It is
decreasing in the mass of Foreign firms, MF , and in the weight the Home government
puts on social welfare, φ.
The larger the parameters fFE, τH and a¯F and the smaller the parameter MF , the fewer
Foreign firms are active on the Home market, and the higher is the ideal price index in
Home. A higher ideal price index in Home implies that the marginal gains of the most
efficient Home firms from the introduction of behind-the-border measures are larger, and
hence their willingness to make political contributions that convince the government to
implement such measures is higher. Not surprisingly, the weight the Home government
puts on social welfare has a negative impact on the equilibrium level of behind-the-border
measures. All other model parameters have an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium level
of behind-the-border measures, as they have an impact on both the marginal gain in
political contributions and the weighted marginal loss in social welfare.
How about the equilibrium level of political contributions? With truthful contribution
schedules CTL (α,BL), the only thing that is left to be determined is the basic level of
welfare BL. In principle, BL indicates how the surplus of the lobby’s political relationship
with the Home government is shared. The lobby wishes to make BL as large as possible
and hence contributions as small as possible. However, as Grossman and Helpman
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(1994) show, if the lobby raised BL beyond a certain point, the Home government
would neglect the lobby’s interest and contributions entirely and, since there are no
other lobbies participating in the lobbying game, implement the socially optimal policy.
Hence, the lobby will make contributions just large enough and set BL just small enough
to make the Home government indifferent between the socially optimal policy α = 1 and
the equilibrium policy αo. That is,
φW (αo) + CTL (α
o, BL) = φW (α=1). (3.19)
If there is only one active lobby, it captures all of the surplus, and merely compensates the
Home government for the weighted loss in social welfare that arises if αo is implemented,
CTL (α
o, BL) = φW (α = 1) − φW (αo). Given that the aggregate profits of Home firms
from selling on the domestic and the export market remain unaffected by changes in α,
the loss in social welfare is equivalent to the loss in consumer surplus that arises from an
increase in the price index, CTL (α
o, BL) = φW (α = 1) − φW (αo) = φLHµ ln PH(αo)PH(α=1) =
φµLH
κ+1−σ
(σ−1)κ ln α
o.
3.4.3.2 Border measures
The same theoretical framework applies if firms lobby for border measures instead. The
only difference is that the variable of interest is now β ∈ [1, β¯] instead of α ∈ [1, α¯].
Correspondingly, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game is denoted{
Coj (β)j∈K , β
o
}
. As before, the welfare of a lobby which is composed of the most efficient
firms is given byWL(β) = pi
L
HD(β)+pi
L
HE. Like in the case of behind-the-border measures,
the lobby’s profits from exporting are independent of β, while its profits from selling on
the domestic market, which are
piLHD(β) =MH
(
aL
a¯H
)κ(µ
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
PH(β)σ−1LHa1−σL
κ
κ+ 1− σ − fHD
)
(3.20)
for all β ≥ 1, depend positively on β via the price index PH(β). Unlike in the case
of behind-the-border measures, however, the lobby’s marginal gain in profits and hence
the marginal gain in political contributions does not decline as β increases. In fact, the
larger β, the larger the lobby’s marginal gain in profits, and the smaller the marginal
loss in social welfare. Therefore, the unique equilibrium policy βo is never in the interior
of
[
1, β¯
]
. The Home government either chooses the highest possible level of border
measures, βo = β¯, or it implements no border measures at all, βo = 1, depending on the
size of the lobby and the weight on social welfare.
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Proposition 3.7 Suppose that assumption 3.1 is satisfied and contribution schedules are
truthful. Further, suppose that either φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
> 0 at β = 1 or φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
<
0 at β = β¯. Then there exists a unique equilibrium level of border measures βo. If
φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
> 0 at β = 1, the Home government implements the highest possible
level of border measures, βo = β¯. If φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
< 0 at β = β¯, the Home government
implements no border measures at all, βo = 1.
For a proof, see the appendix. If neither of these conditions is satisfied, the equilibrium
policy will be either βo = β¯ or βo = 1, depending on which policy makes the Home
government better off. The condition that φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
> 0 at β = 1 is satisfied
if the lobby is rather large, that is if aL is high, and if the weight on social welfare is
rather small, that is if φ is low. In this case, the lobby’s marginal gain from regulations
that deter Foreign firms from entering the Home market is very high, and hence the
government’s marginal gain in contributions is very high, while the weighted marginal
loss in social welfare is rather low. Since the marginal gain in contributions is increasing
in β, while the weighted marginal loss in social welfare is decreasing in β, the Home
government benefits from setting β as high as possible. On the contrary, the condition
that φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
< 0 at β = β¯ is likely to hold if the lobby is rather small and
the weight on social welfare is comparatively high. In this case, the marginal gain in
contributions never exceeds the weighted marginal loss in social welfare in the inter-
val [1, β¯], and the Home government has no incentive at all to complicate customs or
administrative procedures.9
In a truthful equilibrium, the political contributions of the lobby will again reflect the
loss that the government suffers from implementing any policy other than the social
welfare maximizing policy. Hence, if βo = β¯, CTL (β
o, BL) = φW (β=1)− φW (β¯), while
if βo = 1, the lobby will make no political contributions at all.
3.5 Extensions
The basic model as well as the lobbying game lend themselves to several extensions,
including social welfare enhancing behind-the-border measures, interactions between
national governments, and endogenous lobby formation. I will discuss each of these
possibilities in the following.
9Proposition 3.7 obtains even if the firms represented by the lobby consume the manufacturing
good, as long as it is ensured that they all make sufficient profits to cover the associated expenditures
µ. Intuitively, if the firms in the lobby consume the manufacturing good, their marginal gain in profits is
counteracted by their marginal loss in consumer welfare. Adding this marginal loss on part of the lobby
is however equivalent to increasing the relative weight of consumer welfare in the Home government’s
objective function. The marginal loss in social welfare would then be higher, but still decreasing, while
the marginal gain in profits would still be increasing in β, and the equilibrium level of border measures
would again be either βo = β¯ or βo = 1.
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3.5.1 Welfare enhancing measures
Contrary to what I assumed so far, some behind-the-border regulations may have a
beneficial effect on consumer welfare, such as food safety requirements or environmental
standards. In fact, recognizing this potentially positive effect, the WTO explicitly allows
for measures that serve to protect human, animal or plant life and health, but may not
put foreign exporters at a disadvantage in comparison to domestic producers, in article 20
of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade and tries to distinguish them from hidden
protectionist measures in its Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and
on Technical Barriers to Trade.
Allowing for such positive effects of behind-the-border measures to compensate for the
loss in welfare due to higher prices does not alter the preceding analysis that much,
however. The only difference is that even in the absence of lobbying, it may be beneficial
to introduce behind-the-border measures, depending on whether the positive effect on
consumer health, for instance, outweighs the negative effect on prices. With lobbying,
a beneficial effect of technical standards and regulations simply shifts the equilibrium
policy upwards, possibly pushing it to the highest feasible level of behind-the-border
measures, α¯.
3.5.2 Interactions between national governments
The preceding analysis focuses on unilateral trade policies which are implemented by the
national government of one country in response to the pressure applied by a domestic
interest group. However, there is reason to believe that a national government cannot
determine its trade policy in isolation. Rather, it may provoke retaliatory sanctions by
the other country, possibly triggering a trade war, or it may enter into trade negotiations,
eventually ending up in a multilateral agreement on non-tariff barriers to trade. The
issue of interaction between national governments, either noncooperative as in the case
of trade wars, or cooperative, as in the case of trade negotiations, has been addressed in
the traditional Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework by Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
and Grossman and Helpman (1995), for instance.
What are the implications of such interactions at the international level for the equilib-
rium trade policy outcomes in the present model? Formally, they add another stage to
the game, which occurs after the lobbies in Home and Foreign have announced their con-
tribution schedules to their national governments. In this stage, with the contribution
schedules of their domestic lobbies in mind, the Home and the Foreign government either
set their trade policies simultaneously and noncooperatively, or they bargain over the
levels of border or behind-the-border measures to be implemented in Home and Foreign.
Interestingly, when the Home and the Foreign government set their levels of border mea-
sures simultaneously and noncooperatively, the equilibrium trade policy in Home will
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be exactly the same as the one described in the previous section. This is because the
markets in Home and Foreign are separated, and the profits from selling to the domes-
tic market and from exporting are independent of each other. No matter which trade
policy is chosen by the Foreign country, the level of border measures that maximizes
the Home government’s objective function is the same as in a situation without interna-
tional interactions. The Home government’s best response is independent of the Foreign
government’s trade policy choice, and vice versa. Hence, the Home government cannot
credibly commit to retaliatory sanctions in case the Foreign country imposes restrictive
border measures. If β = 1 maximizes the Home government’s welfare function if the
Foreign government chooses to implement no border measures at all, it also maximizes
the Home government’s welfare function if the Foreign government chooses to implement
the highest possible level of border measures. The same argument is true for behind-the-
border measures. Thus, the analysis in the preceding section is robust to noncooperative
interaction between the Home and the Foreign government.
Yet, when the levels of border measures to be implemented in Home and Foreign are
determined cooperatively in a bargaining situation, they are most likely different from
the levels that would obtain in a situation without international interactions. Grossman
and Helpman (1995) point out that if both the Home and the Foreign government enter
into trade negotiations with the aim of maximizing their respective objective function,
the Nash bargaining solution implies that the equilibrium level of border measures in
Home, βo and in Foreign, βoF must be efficient in the sense that they maximize the
weighted sum G¯ = φFG + φGF , where GF is the objective function of the Foreign
government and φF is the weight the Foreign government puts on the social welfare in
its country. Assuming that only the largest firms in Foreign are organized into a single
lobby, substituting in the respective objective functions, and making use of (3.9) and
(3.10) yields
G¯ = φFφ
(
piaggHD(β) + pi
agg
HE (βF ) + LH
(
µ ln
µ
PH(β)
− µ
))
+ φFCL(β, βF )
+ φ φF
(
piaggFD (βF ) + pi
agg
FE (β) + LF
(
µ ln
µ
PF (βF )
− µ
))
+ φ CLF (β, βF )
= φFφ
(
(LH + LF )
µ
κ
σ − 1
σ
+ LH
(
µ ln
µ
PH(β)
− µ
)
+ LF
(
µ ln
µ
PF (βF )
− µ
))
+ φFCL(β, βF ) + φ CLF (β, βF ).
(3.21)
The structure of the problem max β∈[1,β¯],βF∈[1,β¯F ] G¯ is however equivalent to the struc-
ture of the problem considered in section 3.4.3, and we can apply the result of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) again. With truthful contribution schedules, this amounts to the
following first order condition for the equilibrium level of border measures βo in Home:
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φFφ
(
−LH µ
PH(βo)
∂PH(β
o)
∂β
)
+ φF
∂piLHD(β
o)
∂β
+ φ
∂piLFE(β
o)
∂β
= 0 (3.22)
Using the definition of social welfare in Home and taking into account that
∂piaggHD (β)
∂β
=
−∂pi
agg
FE (β)
∂β
, this is equivalent to
φ
∂W (βo)
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂piLHD(β
o)
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+φ
∂piaggFE (β
o)
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
φ
φF
∂piLFE(β
o)
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 or <0
= 0 (3.23)
The first two summands capture the effects of border measures which are already known
from the noncooperative case, that is their negative effect on social welfare in Home,
and their positive effect on the profits of the Home firms organized into a lobby. The
third term reflects the negative effect of border measures in the Home country on the
Foreign profits from exporting. In the noncooperative case, this negative externality is
not taken into account by the Home government, which may result in border measures
which are inefficiently high from a global social welfare perspective. And finally, the
fourth summand captures the political pressure which the lobbying firms in Foreign
exert on their government to make it plead for customs and administrative procedures
in their favor at the negotiating table. The most efficient Foreign firms may actually
prefer a positive level of protection, as it allows them to grab the market shares of the
less efficient Foreign exporters. If the Foreign government puts a relatively high weight
on social welfare, it will however hardly respond to this pressure. Summing up, when
both national governments are susceptible to political pressure, the effect of multilateral
negotiations on the level of protection is ambiguous, since even if they can remedy
inefficiencies in terms of social welfare, they add political pressure from lobbying groups
abroad.
3.5.3 Endogenous lobby formation
Until now I have assumed that only the most efficient Home firms lobby and that the
least efficient lobby member, characterized by marginal costs aL, is exogenously given.
Such an assumption may seem acceptable as it is in line with the empirical evidence and
gives rather clear results. However, in reality no Home firm can be forced to be part of
the lobby, and if I want aL to reflect the equilibrium composition of the lobby, I have
to ensure that indeed no Home firm with marginal costs lower than aL wants to exit
the lobby, and that no Home firm with marginal costs higher than aL wants to joint the
lobby, respectively. Therefore, in the following, I will endogenize aL, and I will do so for
the lobbying game about behind-the-border measures. The same idea and procedure is
however also applicable to the lobbying game about border measures.
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First note that with a continuum of lobby members, each Home firm has only a negligible
impact on the level of behind-the-border measures in the political equilibrium. Thus,
any Home firm in the lobby essentially has an incentive to free ride on the activities of the
other lobby members. It could exit the lobby, save its share in the political contributions
of the lobby, and nevertheless benefit from behind-the-border measures implemented in
response to the pressure of the Home firms which are still members of the lobby. In the
end, with a continuum of Home firms, if each Home firm compares its utility from being
in the lobby with its utility from abstaining from it, it is hard to argue why any lobby
should exist after all.
A very neat way to circumvent such a dilemma is the sincere lobbying approach suggested
by Zudenkova (2008). Translated into the present modeling framework, the idea is that
if a Home firm wants the lobby to exist, it also wants to be a member of the lobby
and bear its share of the lobby’s political contributions. The equilibrium condition for
the lobby formation process then is that no Home firm which is a member of the lobby
wants the lobby to stop existing. The motivation behind such an equilibrium condition
is that Home firms derive a satisfaction from showing their loyalty to a lobby group
which defends their interest. Also, social norms may forbid free riding on the efforts of
others.
If all lobby members would have to bear an equal share of the lobby’s political contri-
butions, such an equilibrium condition would lead to a critical value aL, such that a
Home firm with aL is just indifferent between being a member of the lobby and paying a
share of the contributions and a political equilibrium without the lobby. All Home firms
with marginal costs lower than aL strictly prefer the lobby to exist, since their gain from
the implementation of behind-the-border measures is larger than their share in political
contributions. All Home firms with marginal costs higher than aL gain so little from the
lobby’s activities that they are not willing to bear their share in political contributions,
and hence prefer to have no lobby.
Formally, a Home firm is a member of the lobby and prefers the lobby to exist if
piHD(a, α
o)− C
T
L (α
o)
MH
∫ aL
0
dH(a)
> piHD(a, α = 1) (3.24)
where αo characterizes the level of behind-the-border measures that results if the lobby
exerts political pressure on the Home government. Note that a Home firm’s profits from
exporting to the Foreign market are independent of whether a lobby does or does not
exist. The gain from the implementation of behind-the-border measures, piHD(a, α
o) −
piHD(a, α = 1), is strictly decreasing in marginal costs a and becomes negative if a is
sufficiently large. Hence, there exists a critical level of marginal costs aL for which a
Home firm is just indifferent between being a member of the lobby and not having a
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lobby after all. This critical level aL indicates the composition of the lobby and is given
by
piHD(aL, α
o)− C
T
L (α
o)
MH
∫ aL
0
dH(a)
= piHD(aL, α = 1) (3.25)
which is equivalent to
µ
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
LHPH(α
o)σ−1a1−σL − αofHD −
φµLH
κ+1−σ
(σ−1)κ ln α
o
MH
(
aL
a¯H
)κ
=
µ
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
LHPH(α = 1)
σ−1a1−σL − fHD
(3.26)
Since contributions as well as profits change with the level of behind-the-border mea-
sures, the critical level aL is an implicit function of the policy α
o that results in the
equilibrium of the lobbying game. This equilibrium policy αo in turn depends on the
composition of the lobby and hence on aL, as can be seen from the first order condition
(3.18) for a truthful interior equilibrium. Hence, I have two equations in two unknowns,
aL and α
o. Given the non-linear structure of the underlying functions, however, solving
this system of equations requires numerical methods. Yet, even if it does not lead to
an explicit analytical solution, the sincere lobbying approach seems to be a neat and
tractable way to endogenize the lobby formation process.
3.6 Conclusion
Starting from the observation that the traditional “Protection for Sale” model of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) does not address a couple of interesting issues, the present
paper has proposed a different framework to model lobbying on trade policy. It allows for
intra-industry trade between countries, heterogeneous lobbying activities of firms, and
non-tariff barriers to trade such as technical standards or customs and administrative
procedures as relevant policy instruments.
Technical standards, which are applied to both domestic firms and foreign exporters
and are thus called behind-the-border measures, shift profits within countries, from the
least efficient to the most efficient firms. Behind-the-border measures may also shift
profits across countries, but not necessarily in the direction of the country that is more
productive on average. In any case, from a pure social welfare perspective, it is never
optimal to introduce such measures. With only the largest firms lobbying, they may
nevertheless be an equilibrium outcome, and the model suggests that the level of such
anti-competitive regulations will be the larger, the more restricted trade already is, and
the less the government cares about social welfare.
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Border measures, in contrast, clearly discriminate against foreign exporters. They un-
ambiguously benefit domestic producers, and shift profits away from the foreign country.
Yet, they also raise prices for consumers, and since this negative effect always dominates
the positive effect on profits, border measures will never be chosen by a government that
is solely interested in social welfare. Even if the government is susceptible to political
pressure, it may choose not to implement any protectionists measures at all. If it im-
plements such measures however, it will chose the maximum possible level to prevent
foreign exporters from market entry.
Possible extensions of the model include positive welfare effects of behind-the-border
measures, interactions between national governments, and endogenous lobby formation.
The last issue requires numerical simulations for specific parameter constellations, but
promises interesting results. Another avenue for further research is to allow for the
possibility of foreign lobbying. And finally, the model derives a set of predictions which
are, in principle, empirically testable, given appropriate data on firm productivities,
lobbying expenditures and the level of non-tariff barriers to trade.
The results in this paper are derived in a specific political economy setup, which has
been argued to be a valid description of the trade policy formation process in the United
States (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). For the European Union, however, the political
economy setup may not be as appropriate, and a natural question is whether the results
generalize to the institutional environment which shapes European trade policy. Within
the European Union, trade policies are generally proposed by the European Commission
as a supranational institution, and decided upon by the Council of Ministers as an inter-
governmental institution by majority voting. Lobbying may take place at the interna-
tional level by exerting political pressure on the European Commission or at the national
level by trying to influence the members of the Council of Ministers. Regarding non-tariff
barriers to trade, lobbying the national governments is relatively more important, as in-
dividual member states still have considerable discretion in implementing trade policies
in disguise. In the European Union, rather than swaying bureaucrats’ and politicians’
favors by financial contributions, special interest groups provide selective information to
uninformed decision makers to take legislative influence. Only a few attempts have been
made to capture these complex institutional features (Console Battilani, 2007; Belloc
and Guerrieri, 2008). Yet, to the extent that lobbies have to buy access to legislators
in order to convey their arguments, it stands to reason that trade policy will still be
biased towards the interest of large firms, as only they will be able to incur the costs of
maintaining an office in Brussels, for instance. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the
European institutional environment and the role of individual firms in European trade
policy formation process remains to be done in future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Explicit solutions for price indices, cutoff values
and profits
Using aHD =
(
fHD
LH
) 1
1−σ
(
σ
µ
) 1
1−σ (σ−1
σ
)
PH , aFE =
(
fFE
LH
) 1
1−σ
(
σ
µ
) 1
1−σ (σ−1
σ
)
1
τH
PH , and the
marginal cost distributions with identical shape parameters given by (3.5) and (3.6), the
price index in Home can be calculated as
PH =
(
MH
∫ aHD
0
(
σ
σ − 1 a
)1−σ
dH(a) +MF
∫ aFE
0
(
σ
σ − 1 τHa
)1−σ
dF (a)
) 1
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)κ+1−σ
1−σ
a¯−κH +MF
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(τH a¯F )
−κ
)− 1κ
.
(3.27)
Similarly, the price index in Foreign can be calculated as
PF =
(
MH
∫ aHE
0
(
σ
σ − 1 τFa
)1−σ
dH(a) +MF
∫ aFD
0
(
σ
σ − 1 a
)1−σ
dF (a)
) 1
1−σ
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(
fFD
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(
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−κ
)− 1κ (3.28)
with A =
(
σ
µ
)κ+1−σ
κ(σ−1) ( σ
σ−1
) (
κ
κ+1−σ
)− 1
κ . The corresponding cutoff values are
aHD = B
(
MH
LH
fHDa¯
−κ
H +
MF
LH
f
κ+1−σ
1−σ
FE f
− κ1−σ
HD (τH a¯F )
−κ
)− 1κ
(3.29)
aHE = B
(
MH
LF
fHE a¯
−κ
H +
MF
LF
f
− κ1−σ
HE f
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1−σ
FD τ
κ
F a¯
−κ
F
)− 1κ
(3.30)
aFD = B
(
MF
LF
fFDa¯
−κ
F +
MH
LF
f
κ+1−σ
1−σ
HE f
− κ1−σ
FD (τF a¯H)
−κ
)− 1κ
(3.31)
aFE = B
(
MF
LH
fFE a¯
−κ
F +
MH
LH
f
− κ1−σ
FE f
κ+1−σ
1−σ
HD τ
κ
H a¯
−κ
H
)− 1κ
(3.32)
with B =
(
σ
µ
)− 1
κ ( κ
κ+1−σ
)− 1
κ . Given PH and PF , the profits of a firm with marginal costs
a can be calculated as
piHD(a) = C
(
MH
LH
f
κ+1−σ
1−σ
HD a¯
−κ
H +
MF
LH
f
κ+1−σ
1−σ
FE (τH a¯F )
−κ
) 1−σ
κ
a1−σ − fHD if a ≤ aHD (3.33)
3.6. APPENDIX 61
piHE(a) = C
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and zero otherwise, with C =
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σ
µ
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Appendix B: Proof of proposition 3.1
Integrating individual profits given by (3.3) over all Home firms active on the domes-
tic market, with aHD =
(
αfHD
LH
)1/(1−σ) (
σ
µ
)1/(1−σ) (
σ−1
σ
)
PH and H(a) =
(
a
a¯H
)κH
, gives
aggregate domestic profits of Home firms as a function of the price index PH ,
piaggHD =MH
∫ aHD
0
piHD(a)dH(a) = LH
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σ
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1−σ
(
σ − 1
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1−σ
PκHH .(3.37)
Differentiating with respect to α, taking into account that PH itself depends on α, and
rearranging yields
∂piaggHD
∂α
= LH
MH
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σ
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) κH
1−σ
(
σ − 1
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)κH (αfHD
LH
)κH+1−σ
1−σ PκHH
α
(
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κH + 1− σ PH ,α − 1
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(3.38)
where PH ,α is the elasticity of the price index PH with respect to α. Hence,
∂piaggHD
∂α

> 0 if (σ−1)κHκH+1−σ PH ,α > 1
= 0 if (σ−1)κHκH+1−σ PH ,α = 1
< 0 if (σ−1)κHκH+1−σ PH ,α < 1
(3.39)
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) 1
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and F (a) =
(
a
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)κF
, the equilibrium price
index in Home is implicitly given by
0 =
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with D = MH
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H
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)κH and E = MF
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F
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µ
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σ
)κF τ−κFH .
Using the implicit function theorem and calculating the elasticity of the price index PH
with respect to α yields
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Thus, (σ−1)κH
κH+1−σ PH ,α > 1 and
∂piaggHD
∂α
> 0 if κF+1−σ
κH+1−σκH > κF , or, equivalently, if κH < κF .
Further,
∂piaggHD
∂α
< 0 if κH > κF and
∂piaggHD
∂α
= 0 if κH = κF . The proof for
∂piaggFE
∂α
follows
analogously. 
Appendix C: Proof of proposition 3.2
Differentiating (3.11) with respect to α using (3.38) gives
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Substituting µ in the second summand of equation (3.42) using the implicit solution
(3.40) for the price index in Home gives
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(3.43)
since PH ,α > 0. 
Appendix D: Proof of proposition 3.3
First note that with border measures, the price index in Home is implicitly given by
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Differentiating with respect to β using the implicit function theorem and multiplying
with β
PH
gives
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Now, differentiating social welfare as given by equation (3.11) with respect to β yields
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Substituting µ in the second part of equation (3.46) using the implicit solution (3.44)
for the price index in Home and rearranging gives
∂W
∂β
=
LH
β
−D(fHD
LH
)κH+1−σ
1−σ
PκHH − σE
(
βfFE
LH
)κF+1−σ
1−σ
PκFH
 PH ,β < 0. (3.47)
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Appendix E: Proof of proposition 3.5
With truthful contribution schedules and differentiable profit functions, any equilibrium
policy that lies in the interior of [1, α¯] must satisfy φ∂W (α
o)
∂α
+ ∂WL(α
o)
∂α
= 0, which is
equivalent to φ∂W (α
o)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α
o)
∂α
= 0. Taking the first, second and third derivative
of (3.17) with respect to α, using PH ,α =
κ+1−σ
(σ−1)κ , shows that the marginal gain in
contributions,
∂piLHD(α)
∂α
, is positive, decreasing and convex in α until it reaches zero at
α = αL. Taking the first, second and third derivative of equation (3.11) with respect to α,
taking into account
∂piaggHD
∂α
=
∂piaggHE
∂α
= 0 and PH ,α =
κ+1−σ
(σ−1)κ , shows that the marginal loss in
social welfare, −φ∂W (α)
∂α
, is positive, decreasing, convex, and converges to zero as α goes to
infinity. Restricting parameters such that φ∂W (α)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α)
∂α
> 0⇔ −φ∂W (α)
∂α
<
∂piLHD(α)
∂α
at
α = 1 ensures that −φ∂W (α)
∂α
and
∂piLHD(α)
∂α
cross exactly once in the interior of the interval
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[1, α¯], provided that α¯ > αL, and hence −φ∂W (αo)∂α =
∂piLHD(α
o)
∂α
⇔ φ∂W (αo)
∂α
+
∂piLHD(α
o)
∂α
= 0
characterizes αo as the unique equilibrium level of behind-the-border measures resulting
from the lobbying game. 
Appendix F: Proof of proposition 3.7
With truthful contribution schedules, the Home government acts as if it were maximizing
φW (β) + WL(β), which is equivalent to φW (β) + pi
L
HD(β) + pi
L
HE. Suppose φ
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> 0 at β = 1. This implies that β
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since PH ,β > 0. Both
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and
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depend positively on PH(β) and
∂PH(β)
∂β
> 0. Hence β
LHPH,β
φ∂W (β)
∂β
+ β
LHPH,β
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
> 0
must hold for all β ∈ [1, β¯], which implies that φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
> 0 must also hold for
all β ∈ [1, β¯]. Thus, the first derivative of the Home government’s objective function
is positive for all β ∈ [1, β¯] and hence the Home governments welfare has a unique
maximum at βo = β¯.
Now suppose φ∂W (β)
∂β
+
∂piLHD(β)
∂β
< 0 at β = β¯. Following the same line of arguments as
above, this implies that the first derivative of the Home governments objective function
is negative for all β ∈ [1, β¯] and hence the Home governments welfare has a unique
maximum at βo = 1. 
Chapter 4
Firm size and the choice of export
mode
4.1 Introduction
In international trade theory, it is typically assumed that manufacturing firms which
want to serve the foreign market ship their products directly to their final consumers.
What we observe in reality, however, is that very often trade intermediaries are involved
in the exchange of goods and services across borders. Intermediaries are “... economic
agents that purchase from suppliers for resale to buyers or that help buyers and sellers to
meet and transact” (Spulber, 1996). If buyers and sellers are based in different countries,
these agents are trade intermediaries. They include wholesalers and retailers in the
exporting and importing country as well as large trading companies. In the 1990s, for
instance, Japanese trading companies exported over 40% and imported over 70% of the
country’s products (Jones, 1998), and Hong Kong intermediated over 50% of the volume
of China’s exports to the rest of the world (Feenstra et al., 2004). Survey evidence
suggests that in 2003 in Germany, 47% of all firms with foreign customers exported
directly, while 44% sold their goods abroad indirectly via a trade intermediary (Fryges,
2007).
Only recently, researchers have started to explore why firms may prefer using a trade
intermediary to ship their goods to exporting directly. Not surprisingly, the choice of
export mode depends on destination country characteristics, such as the size of the
foreign market (Schro¨der et al., 2005), the risk of expropriation and the enforceability of
international contracts, or the cultural distance to the target country (Felbermayr and
Jung, 2009).
However, another important insight that emerges from new theoretical contributions on
the choice of export mode is that all else equal, smaller firms prefer to export their
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products via trade intermediaries, while larger firms prefer to sell their goods abroad
directly. Ahn et al. (2010) introduce an intermediation technology in an otherwise
standard heterogeneous firm model of international trade. As in the seminal model of
Melitz (2003), firms can ship their goods directly if they incur a fixed cost of exporting.
Alternatively, firms can export their products via an intermediary at a lower fixed cost,
but at an additional marginal costs. In the presence of such an intermediation technology,
firms sort into export modes according to their sizes. The smallest firms do not export
at all and sell to the domestic market only. Larger firms export indirectly via a trade
intermediary, and the largest firms export directly to the final consumers.
A similar approach is taken by Felbermayr and Jung (2009). In contrast to Ahn et al.
(2010), however, they do not simply assume that the marginal costs of trading indirectly
are higher and thus export revenues are lower, but derive this as a result of the imperfect
enforceability of contracts between exporters and trade intermediaries. Due to this
distortion, larger exporters prefer to incur the higher fixed costs of building their own
distribution network and export their goods directly. For smaller exporters trading via
an intermediary is nevertheless attractive, as it helps them to save on the fixed costs of
exporting.
Blum et al. (2009) consider a search and matching model in which both exporters and
final consumers expend resources to find and match with an appropriate trading partner.
An exporter can match with a final consumer in the foreign country either directly or
indirectly by matching with a trade intermediary who then matches with a final con-
sumer. If the exporter is large, it is highly visible and easy to identify by final consumers
in the foreign country. In this case, matching directly is efficient. On the contrary, if
the exporter is rather small, it is less likely to be found by potential foreign customers
and would have to spend considerable resources to match directly with a final consumer.
Therefore, the smaller exporter better matches with a large trade intermediary who then
matches with a final consumer. A large trade intermediary makes matching cheaper, not
only because it is easier to identify by both exporters and foreign customers, but also
because it pools the costs of matching and spreads them over many exporters and final
consumers.1
Although the theoretical literature provides clear results on the relationship between firm
size and the choice of export mode, to date there is very little evidence whether these
results are also empirically valid. The present papers fills this gap and uses data from the
World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in Turkey in 2008 to evaluate whether smaller
firms do indeed rely more heavily on trade intermediaries. In addition to information
about a variety of firm characteristics, the survey provides information about the share
1A similar argument has been made by Rauch andWatson (2002), who show that trade intermediaries
can draw on strong networks and thereby facilitate matches between domestic sellers and foreign buyers.
The relevance of formal and informal networks for shaping bilateral trade relations has been emphasized
among others by Rauch (1999), Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Combes et al. (2005).
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of revenues generated by selling domestically, by exporting directly, and by exporting
indirectly via a trade intermediary. It covers a comparatively large representative sample
of Turkish firms in terms of firm size, and includes both exporters and non-exporters
from a broad range of manufacturing sectors. An indisputable drawback of the data is
that it does not contain any information on the destination of a firm’s exports. However,
I will argue that if the number and the identity of a firm’s export markets depends on
the firm’s size, there is still a clear prediction regarding the relationship between firm
size and the share of indirect exports in total exports. A small firm will start exporting
indirectly to a foreign market which is easily accessible. A large firm will deliver to the
same market rather directly. Even if it uses a trade intermediary to enter into additional
foreign markets, which are most likely less accessible, the share of indirect exports in total
exports will be lower as it is for a small firm. In other words, if I do not control for the
number of destination countries served, I would underestimate the negative relationship
between firm size and the relative prevalence of intermediated exports.
In fact, the empirical analysis suggests that the share of indirect exports in total exports
declines significantly with firm size, and this result is robust to the inclusion of a variety
of control variables, different estimation methods and different measures of firm size.
In particular, adding proxies for firm age, management experience, ownership structure,
legal status or research and development activities has no effect on the sign or significance
of the estimated coefficient of firm size. Going beyond ordinary least squares regressions
and applying a non-linear quasi-maximum likelihood estimator developed for fractional
dependent variables does not change the main conclusions either, nor does it matter
whether sales or employees are used as a measure of firm size.
I further find that firms which are part of a larger company export a larger fraction of
their goods indirectly, which is in line with the idea that these firms trade relatively
more intermediate inputs and unfinished goods with each other, and export relatively
less final goods which are potentially shipped directly to the final consumer. Having a
highly skilled workforce and developing new and innovative products is generally asso-
ciated with relatively less indirect exports, which is consistent with the argument that
technically more sophisticated products require more direct contact to the customers,
and that innovative firms prefer a higher level of control.
As already pointed out, evidence on the relationship between firm size and the choice
of export mode is scarce. Using census data on exports of U.S. firms, Felbermayr and
Jung (2009) relate the relative prevalence of trade intermediaries to destination country
characteristics as well as to the dispersion of firm size across industries. They find that
industries with a higher size dispersion exhibit a significantly lower relative prevalence
of trade intermediaries, a result that is consistent with their prediction regarding the
sorting pattern of firms into different export modes. However, they do not provide direct
evidence at the firm level regarding the relationship between firm size and the choice
of export mode. Analyzing survey data of German and British firms, Fryges (2007)
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identifies the factors that drive firms to switch between different export modes. Con-
trolling for destination country characteristics, he finds that firm size has a significantly
positive effect on the probability to change from indirect exports to direct exports, and
interprets his result as evidence for the claim that larger exporters are more likely to
dispose of sufficient resources to establish their own distribution network abroad. How-
ever, his sample is rather small and covers only young firms in high-tech industries.
Hessels and Terjesen (2010) also provide evidence on the determinants of the choice of
export mode at the firm level. For a sample of small and medium sized enterprises in
the Netherlands, they find no significant effect of firm size on the probability to export
indirectly as opposed to directly, which is presumably due to their very small sample
which basically excludes the largest firms in the economy.
In the following section, I sketch a very simple and highly stylized model on the rela-
tionship between firm size and the choice of export mode to capture the main arguments
from the literature and to clarify the basic idea. In section 4.3, I derive some testable
hypotheses on the relationship between firm size and the choice of a trade intermediary.
I briefly describe the data in section 4.4 before I show the results of the empirical analysis
in section 4.5. In section 4.6, I address the robustness of the results, before I summarize
and conclude in section 4.7.
4.2 A simple model
There are two symmetric countries each of which is populated by a mass L of consumers
with identical preferences over a continuum of varieties of a differentiated good,
U =
(∫
c
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
(4.1)
with σ > 1. The assumption of symmetry is not crucial for the results and can easily
be relaxed. Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor, and the wage rate is
normalized to one. Aggregate demand in each country for each variety i is
qi =
Lp−σi
P 1−σ
(4.2)
where pi is the consumer price of variety i and P =
(∫
p1−σi di
) 1
1−σ is the ideal price index
over all consumed varieties.
The differentiated good is produced with increasing returns to scale under monopolistic
competition, which implies that each variety will be produced by at most one firm, and
no firm will produce more than one variety. To produce one unit of variety i for its
domestic market, firm i requires ai units of labor. Firms differ in their marginal costs
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ai. As in Melitz (2003), they can learn about their marginal costs only after they have
made a fixed investment of fE units of labor, which is thereafter sunk. In addition to
the variable costs of production, there are fixed distribution costs of f units of labor,
which reflect the resources needed to build a distribution network, to maintain customer
relations or to meet specific product standards.
If a firms wants to sell its variety abroad, it has the choice between two different export
modes. It can either ship its products directly to the final consumers. In this case,
the firm has to incur iceberg trade costs τD > 1, which reflect transport costs, import
tariffs and other variable costs related to shipping the product abroad. In addition, the
firm has to pay fixed distribution costs of fD units of labor. Alternatively, the firm can
use a trade intermediary. Exporting indirectly via a third party causes iceberg trade
costs τI > 1 and fixed distribution costs of fI units of labor. Using both export modes
simultaneously to ship goods to a given destination country is never optimal, as this
creates unnecessarily high fixed costs.
It is assumed that the variable trade costs of exporting indirectly are higher than the
variable trade costs of exporting directly, τI > τD. One interpretation is that the higher
variable costs of exporting indirectly reflect an additional markup charged by the trade
intermediary (Ahn et al., 2010). Another reason might be that the contract between the
firm and the trade intermediary is not enforceable, and hence the trade intermediary
has an incentive to hold up the manufacturer, which leads to lower export revenues
(Felbermayr and Jung, 2009).2
Further, the fixed distribution costs associated with indirect exporting are assumed to be
lower than the fixed costs of exporting directly, fI < fD. Intuitively, trade intermediaries
can spread the fixed costs of building and maintaining a distribution network across many
manufacturers and thus lower them for each individual firm (Schro¨der et al., 2005). In
addition, a trade intermediary is more familiar with the target market and draws on
strong networks, making access to this market cheaper (Felbermayr and Jung, 2009).
Finally, for a manufacturing firm searching for a trade intermediary is most likely not
as costly as searching for many new customers abroad (Ahn et al., 2010; Blum et al.,
2009). In any case, getting access to a distribution network is more expensive abroad
than at home, f < fI < fD.
The profit maximizing consumer price for variety i is pHi =
σ
σ−1ai on the domestic
market. On the foreign market, it is pIi =
σ
σ−1τIai if the good is exported indirectly and
pDi =
σ
σ−1τDai if the good is exported directly. Multiplying prices with the respective
2Strictly speaking, higher iceberg trade costs lead to higher marginal costs for the manufacturer,
while both the additional markup charged by the trade intermediary and the hold up problem due to
incomplete contract enforcement would lead to higher consumer prices, but not to higher marginal costs
for the manufacturer. Yet, the effect of higher iceberg trade costs on the revenues and profits of the
manufacturer is qualitatively the same as the effect of higher consumer prices. See also the discussion
in Felbermayr and Jung (2009) on this point.
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quantities and simplifying notation gives the following expressions for the potential sales
firm i can make on the domestic and foreign market,
sHi = A ϕi (4.3)
sIi = A τ
1−σ
I ϕi (4.4)
sDi = A τ
1−σ
D ϕi (4.5)
where A ≡ L
P 1−σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
captures market conditions such as the size of the population
and the aggregate price level, which is determined endogenously, and ϕi = a
1−σ
i is a
measure of firm productivity. The potential profits firm i can generate at home or
abroad, given aggregate demand in the respective countries, are
piHi =
A
σ
ϕi − f (4.6)
piIi =
A
σ
τ 1−σI ϕi − fI (4.7)
piDi =
A
σ
τ 1−σD ϕi − fD. (4.8)
Firm i will be active on the domestic market only if piHi ≥ 0. It will export indirectly if
piIi ≥ 0 and piIi > piDi , and export directly if piDi ≥ piIi . As marginal costs are constant, the
decision to be active on the home market and the decision to export are independent
of each other. This defines the following productivity cutoff values for selling on the
domestic market, for exporting indirectly, and for exporting directly,
ϕH =
σf
A
(4.9)
ϕI =
σfI
A τ 1−σI
(4.10)
ϕD =
σ(fD − fI)
A (τ 1−σD − τ 1−σI )
(4.11)
with ϕH < ϕI < ϕD, under the assumption that the difference in fixed export costs
is sufficiently large to make indirect exporting attractive for small exporters, fD/fI >
(τI/τD)
σ−1. The least productive firms with ϕi < ϕH are not able to cover the fixed
distribution costs and exit the market. All firms with ϕH ≤ ϕi < ϕI sell their products on
the domestic market only, while all firms with ϕI ≤ ϕi < ϕD also serve the foreign market
via indirect exports. The most productive firms with ϕi ≥ ϕD choose to deliver their
products directly to their foreign consumers. The productivity cutoff values, together
with the distribution of marginal costs or firm productivities, respectively, determine
the aggregate price level.
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4.3 Hypotheses on the choice of export mode
The sorting pattern of firms into purely domestic sellers, indirect exporters and direct
exporters implies that the share of indirect exports in total exports to a given destination
country is
Si =
sIi
sIi + s
D
i
=
{
1 if ϕI ≤ ϕi < ϕD
0 if ϕD ≤ ϕi (4.12)
In a world with a variety of destination countries with different characteristics, such as
population size, the aggregate price level or the extent of the fixed and variable trade
costs, a strict partitioning into only indirect and only direct exporters will of course
not be observed, as the respective productivity cutoff values for different destination
countries will overlap. However, I would expect a negative relationship between the share
of indirect exports in total exports and firm productivity to persist. Highly productive
firms may serve additional countries which are not profitable enough for inefficient firms,3
and they may even use a trade intermediary if these countries are hardly accessible. Yet,
as highly productive firms will also ship their goods directly to markets that inefficient
firms can access only via a trade intermediary, their share of indirect exports in total
exports will most likely be lower.
Ideally, I would like to test the relationship between indirect exports and firm produc-
tivity directly. However, firm productivity is unobserved and has to be estimated from
the data. This is inherently problematic and estimates of firm productivity are most
likely inconsistent due to simultaneity problems. There are methods to deal with such
problems, but they generally require a panel dimension that the survey data I use in this
paper is lacking.4 Therefore, I will use firm size as measured by employment as a proxy
for firm productivity instead. Employment is observable, and it is positively correlated
with firm productivity. To see this, note that the labor used by a firm with productivity
ϕi to produce and distribute its variety on the domestic and foreign market is
li =

A σ−1
σ
ϕi + f if ϕ
H ≤ ϕi < ϕI
A σ−1
σ
(
1 + τ 1−σI
)
ϕi + f + fI if ϕ
I ≤ ϕi < ϕD
A σ−1
σ
(
1 + τ 1−σD
)
ϕi + f + fD if ϕ
D ≤ ϕi
(4.13)
which is a strictly increasing function of firm productivity ϕi under the assumptions
made on the fixed and variable trade costs.
3A positive relationship between firm productivity or firm size and the number of export destinations
is documented by Bernard et al. (2009) and Eaton et al. (2008), for instance.
4Usually, firm productivity is interpreted as the residual that results from fitting a specific production
function. A simultaneity problem arises because a firm may observe its productivity and change its
factor inputs. Panel data methods to deal with this issue have been suggested by Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), who use lagged investment or intermediate inputs as proxies,
respectively.
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There is also strong empirical evidence for the positive relationship between firm size
as measured by employment and firm productivity that arises in heterogeneous firm
models of international trade. Ark and Monnikhof (1996) show this relationship for
France, Germany, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom. Leung et al.
(2008) and Baldwin et al. (2002) add evidence on the positive relationship between
employment and productivity for Canada, and Biesebroeck (2005) documents it for a
variety of African countries.Snodgrass and Biggs (1995) also find a large productivity
gap between the largest and the smallest manufacturing firms in Turkey.
I am now ready to formulate the main hypothesis on the relationship between firm size
and the choice of export mode as reflected by the share of indirect exports in total
exports.
Hypothesis 4.1 There is a negative relationship between firm size and the share of
indirect export sales in total export sales.
Apart from size, other firm characteristics are likely to influence the choice of export
mode. The age of the firm may play a role, as hypothesized by the international business
literature (e.g. Bilkey and Tesar, 1977 or Bilkey, 1978). Young firms start out as purely
domestic firms, and once they are established on the national market, they start to
export indirectly. After having made first experiences in the foreign market, they begin
to export also directly. Thus, I expect a negative impact of firm age on the share of
indirect exports in total exports.
Hypothesis 4.2 There is a negative relationship between firm age and the share of
indirect export sales in total export sales.
Further, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) argue that firms which invest in new technologies
and offer innovative and sophisticated products prefer a higher level of control over their
foreign activities and therefore rather chose the direct export mode. If they would use a
trade intermediary, which has to be trained an equipped with the technological know how
that is necessary to sell the product, they would risk losing their competitive advantage.
From this I hypothesize that a higher degree of innovation is associated with a lower
share of indirect exports in total exports.
Hypothesis 4.3 There is a negative relationship between firm innovativeness and the
share of indirect export sales in total export sales.
And finally, as the enforceability of international contracts improves, the hold-up prob-
lem associated with using a trade intermediary becomes less severe, making indirect
exports more attractive (Felbermayr and Jung, 2009). Thus, there is most likely a pos-
itive relationship between the level of contract enforceability and the share of indirect
exports in total exports.
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Hypothesis 4.4 There is a positive relationship between contract enforceability and the
share of indirect export sales in total export sales.
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics
This study uses data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
carried out by the World Bank in cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development in Turkey in 2008. Similar surveys have been conducted elsewhere,
in particular in a variety of Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Compared
to Turkey, however, sample sizes in these countries are very small and the results are
presumably not as reliable. Yet, as a simple robustness check, I will extend the anal-
ysis to firms in these countries, controlling for country fixed effects. All data is freely
accessible to researchers5 and comprises rich information on stratified random samples
of firms with different sizes from different sectors and geographic regions.
As manufacturing firms are the focus of the theoretical literature on firm size and inter-
mediated trade, I exclude those firms from the Turkish sample that are in the service,
telecommunication or construction sector.6 This leaves me with 748 firms for which I
have observations on the main variables of interest.
To give a first impression on the relationship between firm size and the relative impor-
tance of different export modes, table 4.1 assigns the 748 firms to different size categories
according to the number of full-time employees and indicates the percentage of firms
within each size category which do not export at all and serve only the domestic market,
which export exclusively via trade intermediaries, which use both the indirect and the
direct export channel, and which ship their goods only directly. About 39% of the 748
manufacturers sell all their goods nationally and do not export at all. Approximately
12% of all firms in the sample export only via trade intermediaries, while 17% export
both indirectly and directly, and 31% export only directly. The share of non-exporters
is considerably higher among small firms with less than 20 employees, and is much lower
among large firms with 100 or more employees. The reverse is true for the share of
direct exporters. While it is only 23% among small firms, it is 49% and 69% among
medium sized and large firms, respectively. This finding is in line with what is now
considered a fact in the empirical literature on firms in international trade, namely that
in a cross-section of firms, exporters are generally larger than non-exporters.7 Similarly,
5http://www.enterprisesurveys.org
6The remaining sectors are food (15), textiles (17), garments (18), chemicals (24), plastics and rubber
(25), non-metallic mineral products (26), basic metals (27), fabricated metal products (28), machinery
and equipment (29), and electronics (31 and 32), with the number in parentheses indicating the Rev.
3.1 International Standard Industrial Classification code.
7See for instance Bernard and Jensen (1995) or Bernard et al. (2007).
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the share of indirect exporters rises from 19% to 38% when moving from the small to
the large firm category.
Table 4.1: Export status and firm size
Firm size measured by employees
Export status < 20 20− 99 ≥ 100 Total
No exports 65% 39% 18% 39%
Indirect exports only 11% 12% 13% 12%
Indirect and direct exports 8% 17% 25% 17%
Direct exports only 15% 32% 44% 31%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of firms 201 309 238 748
Comparing the prevalence of different export modes across different firm size categories
suggests that as firms get larger, they shift from non-exporters to indirect exporters,
and further from indirect exporters to direct exporters. The relative prevalence of firms
which use an indirect export channel as opposed to firms which do not export at all
increases with firm size. However, the relative prevalence of firms which use a trade
intermediary as opposed to firms which export only directly declines as firms get larger.
Summary statistics for the 453 firms which export either indirectly or directly or both
are given in table 4.2. All information refers to the fiscal year 2007. Firms were asked
to indicate their total annual sales in local currency and to report the percentage of
total annual sales that were national sales, indirect exports, which were specified as
goods sold domestically to a third party that exports them, and direct exports. With
this information I can construct the measure Si. The share of indirect exports in total
exports is 0.335 on average and varies considerably across exporters.8 Firm size as
the main explanatory variable is measured by the number of full-time employees. The
distribution of firm size is skewed to the right, with a mean of 186 and a median of 70
employees.
In addition to firm size, a variety of other firm characteristics may have an impact on
the export behavior and need to be taken into account in the empirical analysis in order
to avoid that their effect on the share of indirect exports in total exports is wrongly
assigned to the effect of firm size.9 Firm age indicates the years that have passed since
the establishment began its operations and thus captures whether the firm is new to
8Unfortunately, total annual sales are not available for all firms in the sample. However, as I am
mainly interested in the relative prevalence of intermediated trade as opposed to direct exports, I keep
firms with missing information on total annual sales in the sample, as long as they report an estimate of
the percentage of total annual sales that were due to indirect and direct exports, respectively. Excluding
these firms from the sample and taking sales as a proxy for firm productivity does however not change
the main conclusions.
9For an overview of the variables that are commonly used to explain the export behavior of firms
see Bernard and Jensen (2004), Wagner (2001), and Fryges (2007), for instance.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Si 0.335 (0.415) 0 1 453
Ln(sales) 16.087 (1.615) 9.393 20.34 390
Firm size 186.139 (377.211) 2 4263 453
Firm age 18 (11.864) 0 82 453
Experience 23.834 (12.313) 1 70 453
Multiplant 0.11 (0.314) 0 1 453
Share university 0.138 (0.16) 0 0.9 453
Share nonproduction 0.25 (0.172) 0 0.842 453
R&D 0.347 (0.476) 0 1 453
New product 0.523 (0.5) 0 1 453
Courts 1.06 (1.294) 0 4 453
Days to clear customs 5.38 (6.815) 0 60 345
Losses in direct exports 1.169 (7.382) 0 100 337
the market, while experience describes the years the top manager has worked in the
respective sector. Multiplant is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is part of a
larger company. If this is the case, however, all information given in the survey refers
to the firm, and not to the larger company. Share university indicates the fraction of
employees that have a university degree and hence is a measure for skill intensity, while
share nonproduction indicates the fraction of employees that do not work in production,
but in areas such as management, administration, sales, or research and development.
Both R&D and new product are dummy variables that equal 1 if the firm invested in
research and development in 2007 or introduced a new product in the past three years,
respectively. These variables reflect firm innovativeness. The variable courts indicates
whether firms perceive courts to be an obstacle to their current operations. Answers
are integers ranging from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). Courts is used as
a proxy for the enforceability of contracts. Some variables of interest are defined only
for a subset of firms. The average number of days to clear customs is relevant only for
direct exporters, as well as the losses in direct exports, which measure the percentage
of consignment value of the products exported directly that was lost while in transit
because of theft, breakage or spoilage. These variables may be seen as indicators for the
variable costs of shipping goods directly to final consumers.
Table 4.3: Share of indirect exports in total exports and firm size
Firm size measured by employees
< 20 20− 100 ≥ 100
Indirect exports/total exports (Si) 0.44 0.33 0.31
Sorting exporters into different size categories as in table 4.1 and looking at the average
share of indirect exports in total exports sheds first light on the relative importance of
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intermediated as opposed to direct trade. It seems that indirect exports are indeed less
important for larger firms. However, to gain deeper insight into the determinants of the
choice of export mode, I will now turn to a multivariate analysis.
4.5 Empirical results
To assess the correlation between firm size and the relative importance of intermediated
exports, I will first estimate simple equations of the form
Si = β0 + β1 ln(firm sizei) + β2Xi + i (4.14)
where Si is the share of indirect exports in total exports of firm i, Xi is a vector of
control variables, and i is an error term. Nearly all estimations include sector and
region dummies.10 The econometric method used will be simple ordinary least squares
regressions with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.11 Results are presented in
columns (1) to (3) of table 4.4.
Column (1) of table 4.4 shows the estimated coefficient of log firm size from a naive
regression without further control variables. It is negative and significant, which is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that larger firms have a lower share of indirect exports in
total exports. However, firm size is correlated with a set of other firm characteristics
which may affect the relative importance of indirect exports. For instance, larger firms
are more likely to be part of a larger company, and they have a lower share of non-
production employees, reflecting economies of scale in headquarter services.12 Including
such firm characteristics, but omitting firm size in column (2) of table 4.4 shows that
being part of a larger company is associated with a significantly higher share of indirect
exports in total exports. A firm’s degree of innovation as measured by the variables
share nonproduction, R&D and new product, on the contrary, has a negative impact on
the relative prevalence of intermediated exports. Hence, controlling for these additional
firm characteristics is important to estimate the true relationship between firm size and
the share of indirect exports in total exports.
In fact, as reported in column (3) of table 4.4, the negative relationship between firm
size and the relative importance of intermediated exports is reinforced once other firm
characteristics are controlled for. The estimated coefficient of log firm size falls from
-0.028 to -0.050 and gets highly significant. It implies that for the smallest firm with
only two employees, one more worker is associated with a decline in the share of indirect
10For the purpose of the survey, Turkish provinces have been aggregated into five regions, which are
Marmara, Aegean, Black Sea and Eastern Turkey, Central Anatolia, and South Turkey.
11A Breusch-Pagan test rejects the hypotheses of constant variance.
12The correlation coefficient is 0.205 for firm size and multiplant, and -0.125 for firm size and share
nonproduction.
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exports in total exports by about -0.025. The sign and the size of the coefficient of log
firm size are very robust to the inclusion of further firm characteristics, such as the legal
status of the firm or the share of the firm that is owned by foreign investors. As these
control variables turned out to be insignificant, however, I omitted them from the set
of regressors. The results are also insensitive to the use of different functional forms of
firm size.13
Table 4.4: Effect of firm size on Si
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS QMLE
Ln(firm size) -0.028* -0.050*** -0.054***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Firm age -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Multiplant 0.161** 0.199*** 0.223***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.070)
Share university 0.008 0.068 0.069
(0.122) (0.121) (0.136)
Share nonproduction -0.183 -0.274** -0.294**
(0.131) (0.134) (0.145)
R&D -0.025 -0.017 -0.016
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
New product -0.093** -0.093** -0.098**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Courts 0.028* 0.025 0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Sector dummies no yes yes yes
Region dummies no yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes
N 453 453 453 453
R2 0.008 0.093 0.110 -
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As pointed out in the introduction, I cannot control for the number of destination
countries, nor for the characteristics of specific foreign markets. Part of this effect may
be captured by the sector dummies, which indicate the comparative advantage of an
industry compared to potential trading partners, and by the region dummies, which
reflect the proximity of the firm to a specific destination country. Nevertheless, if larger
firms use a trade intermediary to export to less accessible countries which are not served
13See the appendix for the results of these alternative specifications.
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by smaller firms, the estimated coefficient is a rather conservative indicator for the
negative relationship between firm size and the share of indirect exports in total exports
to a given destination country. In other words, if I could run a separate regression for
each destination country, I would presumably find a coefficient of firm size that is much
larger in absolute terms.
Neither firm age nor the experience of the manager seem to play an important role for
the choice of export mode. This might not be surprising, as both are very crude proxies
for the experience of a manufacturer in a given destination country. As an alternative
measure for foreign experience I used the years that have passed since the firm first
exported. However, this variable is available only for a small subset of exporters. It
turned out to have no significant effect on the share of indirect exports in total exports,
neither did it change the coefficient of log firm size.
Being part of a larger company, as indicated by the multiplant variable, has a sig-
nificantly positive effect on exporting indirectly as opposed to exporting directly. A
potential explanation might be that firms which are part of a larger company mainly
sell intermediate inputs and unfinished goods to related firms, but ship relatively less
products directly to final consumers.
The fraction of employees that have a university degree per se does not seem to play
an important role for the choice of export mode, although part of the effect of a high
skilled labor force might be captured by the fraction of employees that work in areas
other than production. However, investing in research and development and launching
new products has a negative effect on the relative prevalence of intermediated trade.
Both variables are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.056. This is in line with the
hypothesis that innovative firms prefer a higher level of control regarding their foreign
sales mode.
The variable courts which is supposed to capture the legal environment and the enforce-
ability of contracts does not have the expected sign, nor is it significant. Firms were
asked not only whether they perceive courts as an obstacle to their operations, but also
whether they perceive the legal system as fair, impartial and uncorrupted, whether they
think that the court system is quick, and whether they believe that the court system is
able to enforce its decisions. None of these alternative measures had a significant impact
on the share of intermediated exports in total exports. This may be due to the fact that
these measures are highly subjective, and potentially endogenous to the choice of export
mode. That is, a firm that frequently contracts with a trade intermediary is more likely
to end up in a dispute, and may then perceive dealing with courts as a hindrance to its
current operations. In addition, agreements between the exporter and the intermediary
may be subject to the legal system in the importing country, in which case courts would
not have any informative value for the actual enforceability of contracts.
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Some researchers have raised concerns about using ordinary least squares regressions if
the dependent variable is a proportion that, by definition, can only take values from
0 to 1. Wagner (2001) has argued that this problem may be especially severe if there
are many limit observations, as in the case of the export to sales ratio, but also in
the present case where the dependent variable is indirect exports over total exports.
Basically, because the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, the effect of
any explanatory variable cannot be constant throughout its range. Including non-linear
functions of the explanatory variable such as log firm size partly alleviates the problem,
however, the predicted values from an ordinary least squares regression can never be
guaranteed to lie in the interval [0, 1]. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest a non-linear
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) that yields consistent and asymptotically
normal distributed estimates regardless of the distribution of the dependent variable
conditional on the controls, and that leads to predicted values between 0 and 1. The
results from applying the fractional response model to the relationship between firm
size and the relative importance of indirect exports are presented in column (4) of table
4.4. Note that the reported numbers are marginal effects, which depend on the specific
likelihood function and thus differ from the estimated coefficients.
The marginal effect of log firm size on the share of indirect exports in total exports
is -0.054 and thus very similar to the marginal effect obtained from an ordinary least
squares regression. Log firm size remains significant at the 1% level. The sign and the
significance of the marginal effects of other explanatory variables do not change much
either, indicating that the results are insensitive to the econometric method used.
In table 4.5, I reduce the sample to those exporters that ship at least part of their goods
directly to evaluate the impact of customs clearance procedures and transport risks on
the choice of export mode. As I lose all observations for which Si = 1, it is not surprising
that the negative relationship between firm size and the relative prevalence of indirect
exports gets weaker and insignificant. In fact, finding no large and significant effect of
firm size once I restrict the sample to direct exporters suggests that large firms which
enter into additional countries and use both the direct and the indirect export mode
do not drive the main results. Most explanatory variables lose their predictive power,
indicating that the firms which use only the indirect export mode are indeed very dif-
ferent from the firms which also use the direct export mode. The main point, however,
is that the higher the losses in the transit of direct exports due to theft, breakage, and
spoilage, the higher the relative share of indirect exports.14 Of course, higher transport
costs affect not only the direct exporters, but also the trade intermediaries that ship
the goods on behalf of the manufacturers, and to the extent that the trade intermedi-
aries forward theses costs to their suppliers, higher losses would also raise the variable
costs of exporting indirectly. Yet, trade intermediaries usually ship the goods of more
than one manufacturer and thus can pool the risks of suffering losses in the transit of
14This result is robust to removing outliers who lost 100% of their shipments in transit.
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goods, implying that indirect exports get relatively more attractive when the risk of high
transport costs becomes larger. In that sense, the finding that higher losses in direct
exports increase the relative prevalence of indirect exports is in line with the argument
that trade intermediaries perform an important role in mitigating the risks associated
with engaging in foreign markets (Spulber, 1998).
Table 4.5: The effect of export risk on Si
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Ln(firm size) -0.004 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013)
Firm age 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Experience 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Multiplant 0.095 0.096
(0.061) (0.061)
Share university -0.097 -0.133
(0.088) (0.096)
Share nonproduction -0.134 -0.123
(0.097) (0.099)
R&D -0.050 -0.056*
(0.031) (0.032)
New product 0.007 0.005
(0.033) (0.033)
Courts -0.009 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011)
Days to clear customs -0.001
(0.002)
Losses in direct exports 0.003*
(0.002)
Sector dummies yes yes
Region dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
N 329 329
R2 0.079 0.087
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 81
4.6 Robustness checks
In this section, I will perform a number of robustness checks. First, I will extend the
analysis on the relationship between firm size and the relative importance of intermedi-
ated trade to a larger sample of Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Second,
I will use the log of sales as an alternative measure of firm size. In addition, I will used
lagged employment as a measure of firm size, and I will control for total factor produc-
tivity to substantiate the claim that firm size is an adequate proxy for firm productivity.
The enlarged sample contains firms from thirty Eastern European and Central Asian
countries, including Turkey. As I have already pointed out, sample sizes in these coun-
tries are comparatively small and do in many cases not comprise more than fifty ex-
porters. Pooling firms from all countries, and controlling for country fixed effects yields
the results presented in table 4.6.15 As indicated in column (1), the relationship between
firm size and the share of indirect exports in total exports is again negative and highly
significant. It remains significant but gets much smaller in absolute terms if I restrict
the sample to firms with Si < 1, as shown in columns (2) and (3) of table 4.6. Quantita-
tively, the marginal effects of firm size are in the range of the marginal effects reported
in columns (1) and (2) of table 4.5, but the larger sample of direct exporters allows for
more precision and lower standard errors.
The results for sales as an alternative measure of firm size are reported in column (1) of
table 4.7. Firm size has still a negative and highly significant effect on the prevalence
of intermediated exports as opposed to direct exports. The sign and significance of the
coefficients estimated for other control variables are also in line with the results reported
in column (3) of table 4.4.
Further, as indicated in column (2) of table 4.7, using the number of full-time employees
in 2004 rather than in 2007 as a measure of firm size yields very similar results. Firms
that are larger in 2004 have a lower share of indirect exports in total exports in 2007.
This suggests that causality may in fact run from firm size to the relative prevalence of
intermediated trade, unless firms anticipate their export activities already three years in
advance and adopt their production capacities. The finding is also consistent with other
results from the empirical trade literature which show that high productivity precedes
entry into export markets, substantiating the theory of fixed entry costs.16
As a last robustness check, I use total factor productivity to test the stylized model
presented in section 4.3 in a more direct way. To estimate total factor productivity
at the firm level, I regress for each sector separately the log of value added on the log
of employment and the log of the value of capital used in production, that is land and
15Excluding Turkish firms from the enlarged sample gives the same picture, indicating that results
are not driven by country specific characteristics.
16See Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999), or Aw et al. (2000), just to give a few
examples.
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Table 4.6: Estimations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Ln(firm size) -0.038*** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm age -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multiplant 0.054 0.014 0.015
(0.044) (0.023) (0.023)
Share university -0.007 -0.052 -0.058
(0.045) (0.037) (0.037)
Share nonproduction -0.214*** -0.069 -0.065
(0.050) (0.041) (0.041)
R&D 0.019 0.001 0.000
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
New product -0.047** 0.024** 0.025**
(0.022) (0.011) (0.012)
Courts 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Days to clear customs 0.000
(0.001)
Losses in direct exports 0.002***
(0.001)
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes
N 1702 1190 1190
R2 0.090 0.073 0.074
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS OLS
Ln(sales) -0.039***
(0.014)
Ln(firm size in 2004) -0.037**
(0.018)
Total factor productivity -0.000***
(0.000)
Firm age -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Multiplant 0.217*** 0.149** 0.156*
(0.069) (0.069) (0.080)
Share university 0.060 0.092 0.234
(0.125) (0.137) (0.207)
Share nonproduction -0.095 -0.319** -0.078
(0.146) (0.149) (0.213)
R&D 0.005 -0.041 -0.080
(0.045) (0.046) (0.058)
New product -0.090* -0.102** -0.079
(0.047) (0.048) (0.062)
Courts 0.018 0.027 0.010
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024)
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes
N 390 378 232
R2 0.124 0.118 0.146
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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machinery. I then compute the exponential of the residuals of the estimated equation. As
I have already pointed out, this method is most likely plagued by simultaneity problems,
and hence estimates of total factor productivity might be seriously flawed. In addition,
as I have only a very limited sample of firms in each sector that provided the information
necessary to estimate total factor productivity, the precision of the estimation is rather
low. The results presented in column (3) of table 7 should therefore be interpreted with
caution. What is remarkable, however, is that firm productivity enters negatively, as
hypothesized, and is highly significant.
4.7 Conclusion
Although trade intermediation is a phenomenon well established in reality, it has only
recently been addressed in the international trade literature. While many contributions
focus on the nature of trade intermediaries, little is known about the manufacturers that
actually ship their goods indirectly. Recent theoretical research suggests that the choice
of export mode depends, among other factors, on the size and the productivity of a
firm. Since intermediated exports are associated with lower fixed costs of gaining access
to foreign markets, they are an attractive option for small and rather inefficient firms
which want to export their goods. Building an own distribution network and maintaining
customer relations abroad is much more costly, and only pays for large manufacturers
which are profitable enough to cover the higher fixed costs.
The present paper brings this hypothesis to a test. Using data from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey conducted in Turkey in 2008, it shows that there is indeed a significant
negative correlation between firm size and the relative importance of indirect exports
as opposed to direct exports. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of a variety of
controls, different estimation methods, and different measures of firms size.
One drawback of the data used is that is does not contain any information on the
number and the features of the destination countries a firm serves. This seems to be
a more general problem in the empirical international trade literature. Transaction
based data sets as provided by customs authorities have information on destination
countries, however they rarely provide details on the firms involved in intermediated
trade. Rich information about firm characteristics from the analysis of balance sheet data
or survey data does however rarely comprise details about firms’ export destinations.
Combining both destination country and firm characteristics in a large sample seems to
be a promising avenue for further research on the role of indirect exports for different
manufacturers. Another way to improve upon the existing evidence is to use rigorous
measures of firm productivity estimated from panel data instead of proxies for firm size
such as employment or sales.
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From a theoretical perspective, modeling a trade intermediation sector instead of simply
assuming a specific intermediation technology would be the next step. First attempts in
this direction have been made by Antra`s and Costinot (2010a) and Antra`s and Costinot
(2010b).
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Appendix
Appendix A: Results for alternative specifications
Including additional controls for the legal status of a firm and the percentage of a firm
owned by foreign investors gives the results presented in columns (1) and (2) of table
4.8. Using firm size instead of log firm size or firm size and firm size squared gives the
results indicated in columns (3) and (4) of table 4.8. Note that in column (4), firm size
and firm size squared are jointly significant at the 5% level.
Table 4.8: Effect of firm size on Si for alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln(firm size) -0.049*** -0.049***
(0.017) (0.017)
Firm size -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm size squared -0.000
(0.000)
Firm age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Multiplant 0.205*** 0.212*** 0.178*** 0.178***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
Share university 0.031 0.080 0.021 0.020
(0.125) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122)
Share nonproduction -0.284** -0.247* -0.222* -0.220
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135)
R&D -0.016 -0.008 -0.022 -0.022
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
New product -0.097** -0.104** -0.091** -0.091**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Courts 0.026 0.027* 0.027* 0.027*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Foreign ownership -0.001
(0.001)
Legal status dummies yes no no no
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes
N 453 449 453 453
R2 0.122 0.115 0.098 0.098
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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